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Abstract—For sensitive problems, such as medical imaging or
fraud detection, Neural Network (NN) adoption has been slow
due to concerns about their reliability, leading to a number of
algorithms for explaining their decisions. NNs have also been
found vulnerable to a class of imperceptible attacks, called
adversarial examples, which arbitrarily alter the output of the
network. Here we demonstrate both that these attacks can
invalidate prior attempts to explain the decisions of NNs, and
that with very robust networks, the attacks themselves may be
leveraged as explanations with greater fidelity to the model. We
show that the introduction of a novel regularization technique
inspired by the Lipschitz constraint, alongside other proposed
improvements, greatly improves an NN’s resistance to adversarial
examples. On the ImageNet classification task, we demonstrate
a network with an Accuracy-Robustness Area (ARA) of 0.0053,
an ARA 2.4× greater than the previous state of the art.
Improving the mechanisms by which NN decisions are understood
is an important direction for both establishing trust in sensitive
domains and learning more about the stimuli to which NNs
respond.
I. MOTIVATION
Industry fields wanting to harness the explosion of Ma-
chine Learning (ML) techniques are concerned about the
lack of accountability and explainability within the field [1],
[2]. Biomedical papers report systems which surpass human
experts, but have difficulty proving the added insight of their
techniques beyond statistical correlations [1], [3]. This concern
about explainability applies to a variety of ML algorithms,
but we focus on the sub-field on Neural Networks (NNs).
State-of-the-art methods attempting to explain the reasoning
behind NN decisions focus on the generation of heatmaps
which indicate regions of input salient to the NN’s output [4],
[5]. However, these heatmaps do not communicate information
beyond a rough silhouette, making it difficult to infer much
beyond the general region of an image considered. These
methods additionally rely on the linearization of a highly
non-linear network, and capture relevant details only for the
exact, corresponding input. Minor perturbations can result in
significant changes not only to the explanation, but also to the
NN’s output.
Adversarial attacks (or adversarial examples) are inputs to
ML algorithms which are perceptually similar to examples
that yield good performance from the algorithm, but produce
drastically different output [6], [7]. These have been shown to
exist on a variety of ML algorithms, and not only NNs [8].
The loophole of adversarial attacks poses a security risk at
worst, and has left researchers scratching their heads at best.
Attempts to identify and remedy the problem of adversarial
examples generally agree on the existence of manifolds shared
by the dataset which are incongruous to perceptual manifolds
[9], [10]. Work on adversarial examples has not generally
focused on creating situations in which adversarial examples
are perceptually similar to the targeted class; only Tsipras et al.
[11] touched on this as a curiosity associated with adversarial
training.
We contribute a set of novel techniques which allow for Ad-
versarial Explanations (AEs) to illustrate key salient features
for classification, a much more reliable method of explaining
an NN’s decision. Unlike previous state-of-the-art techniques,
AEs work with network non-linearities to represent the NN’s
decision surface with greater fidelity than heatmaps can pro-
vide, as shown in Figs. 1 and 2. Further discussion of previous
state-of-the-art explanations is presented in Section II-B. In
addition to producing visually rich explanations, our tech-
niques surpass the state of the art in terms of classification
performance in the presence of adversarial examples. We pro-
pose and demonstrate classification networks for the ILSVRC
2012 challenge with 2.4× improved robustness to adversarial
attacks compared to the state of the art, as shown in Fig. 3 and
discussed in Section II-A. Both AEs and improved robustness
were achieved via the methods described in Section III. We
explore the explanatory power and trade-offs of the proposed
techniques, including the ability to train networks to be either
more accurate or robust to attacks, in Section IV. Due to the
visual quality of AEs, they may also be used to synthesize
new examples for an active learning pipeline to improve a
classifier’s robustness, which we demonstrate in Sections III-H
and IV-C. Together, the methodology outlined in this work
demonstrates the viability of producing cogent explanations
via adversarial attacks on robust networks.
II. RELATED WORK
Two branches of ML inquiry led to this work: adversarial
attacks and explanation methods. To better demonstrate the
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Fig. 1: Comparing the explanatory power of Grad-CAM [4] and AE when applied to a robust NN on the ILSVRC classification task. For each input image, a
class prediction was run. The highest prediction is shown on the left of each row, followed by either the second highest prediction or the true class. The “Input”
column shows the input image. The “Grad-CAM1” column shows a Grad-CAM explanation for positive regions of the first predicted class. The “Grad-CAM2”
column shows a Grad-CAM explanation for positive regions of the second-most-likely (or true) class prediction. Following that are AEs for the same two
class predictions, created using gexplain+ from Section III-A2 Each adversarial perturbation shows the new top-two class predictions for the modified image,
the noise perturbation from the original image, and the resulting modified image (the AE). Note that the adversarial perturbations often do not align with the
Grad-CAM-highlighted saliency regions, e.g. in row 4, a picture of a Cairn Terrier. This happened because Grad-CAM is a linearization of the non-linear NN.
In contrast, the AEs worked with the non-linear perturbations to the images, and revealed the textures and structures which were important for identifying each
predicted class. Row 1 demonstrates that a “Tabby Cat” was not predicted as the stripes and whiskers on this animal were too low contrast. Row 2 demonstrates
that the NN did not predict a “Trailer Truck” because there was no clear separation between the cab and the trailer, a quality which was associated with “Tow
Truck” during training. Row 3 was correctly predicted as a “Vizsla,” with a lack of the distinct colorization preventing higher confidence. The colorization also
matched that of the “Redbone” dog, which would require darker nose and eye areas. Row 4, a highly-cropped “Cairn Terrier,” looked more like a lighter due
to the patterns of the clothing behind the dog. To be identified as a “Cairn Terrier,” the NN would have needed an image which captured more pronounced
texturing of the animal’s fur - a partial indication that the image would have needed to be zoomed in on the main subject. An extended discussion of a figure
like this one and the insights of AEs may be found in Section IV-A.
flaws in existing explanation techniques, we cover adversar-
ial attacks before competing explanation methods. A math-
ematical branch, Lipschitz continuity, was also important in
developing this work. In exploring the merits of better NN
explanations, active learning methods were also considered.
These four related areas are discussed in Sections II-A to II-D.
A. Adversarial Attacks
Adversarial attacks, or adversarial examples, were first docu-
mented by Szegedy et al. [6], who showed that an NN’s output
may be arbitrarily changed through imperceptible changes
to the input. Initial criticism that these digitally-induced de-
viations might be a pathological problem were put to rest
by a group from LabSix in 2018 [14]. The LabSix group
fabricated a real-world object which was adversarially misclas-
sified at a variety of angles and scales, demonstrating that the
problem of adversarial examples had real-world consequences
and deserved further study. Many reports have posited that
adversarial examples are a natural extension of the internal
flexibility of NNs [6], [7], [11], [14], [15], and a survey of
the topic of adversarial attacks and defenses covers many
related topics [16]. These reports all support that NNs solve
an underconstrained problem: many possible solutions to the
training data exist on manifolds which are distorted toward
imperceptibility in standard visual space. Adversarial attacks
exploit the incongruence between these learned spaces and the
visual space containing the NN’s input.
The struggle between adversarial attacks and methods of
resisting them is perhaps best illustrated by the saddle point
formulation proposed by Madry et al. [13] (identical to their
approach in [11], though that work contains further analysis;
notation adapted to be consistent throughout the current paper):
3Fig. 2: While adversarial examples are considered a nuisance by most, they
have the potential to provide reliable explanations with the same richness
of information as the original input. For example, when an NN trained at
finding lung nodules in radiographs needs investigation (a, b), an attack may
be targeted at a desired new network output—such as changing a nodule
classification to a non-nodule classification (c) or emphasizing the nodule
(d)—to produce a new image which is minimally changed but produces the
desired output. By comparing these inputs and looking at the differences, a
human operator can identify relevant features in the input with greater fidelity
than prior methods of explanation.
minE(x,t)∼D
[
max
δ∈S
L(θ, x+ δ, t)
]
. (1)
That is, find the network parameterized as θ which, according
to dataset D, produces the best approximation of some target t
when the worst-case noise δ constrained by an allowed attack
space S is added to an input x. This formulation illustrates the
difficulty of working against a high-quality adversary, which
is relatively unrestricted in its exploitation of the network’s
properties around x.
Methods of generating adversarial attacks approximate the
inner maximization problem from Eq. (1). In this work, we
focused on white-box attacks, which are attacks where the
attacker has full knowledge of the model’s internal parameters
and configuration. These were chosen specifically because
they are the most difficult to defend against. Carlini et al.
[15] compared several different methods of generating attacks,
including Goodfellow et al.’s Fast Gradient Sign Method
(FGSM) [7] and their own Projected Gradient Descent (PGD)
[15]. Carlini et al. [15] showed that attacks were transferable
between networks, regardless of network architecture. One
interpretation of this would be that NNs emphasize high-
frequency signals within the data over low-frequency signals,
biasing them toward changes which are imperceptible in the
domain of the input. Recent work by Tsipras et al. [11] argued
that this might be due to the natural tendency of high-accuracy
classifiers to exploit small differences as a means of greedily
leveraging available information. Stutz et al. [17] interestingly
studied the creation of “on-manifold” adversarial examples,
which conform to the original input distribution as defined
by a Variational Autoencoder (VAE) - Generative Adversarial
Network (GAN) hybrid. Unlike with off-manifold, or tradi-
tional, adversarial examples, they found that generalization
accuracy would actually be increased by training with on-
manifold adversarial examples [17]. However, for the purposes
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Fig. 3: Compared to the state of the art, our method achieved NNs which
were tolerant of greater adversarial perturbations on both ImageNet (Fig. 3a)
and CIFAR-10 (Fig. 3b). By measuring the ARA, a model’s resistance to
adversarial attacks is taken into consideration alongside its ability to make
predictions better than the naive baseline (the hatched region). See Section II-A
for additional details.
* Madry et al. used a network that was 10× as wide as a traditional ResNet-
110, and also trained against an Linf adversary rather than an L2 adversary
[13].
† This curve came from personal communication with A. Madry on a standard
ResNet-50; see Section II-A for details.
of the current work, even “off-manifold” adversarial examples
still fit into the NN’s valid input space, and an attacker often
creates attacks outside of the original data manifold to exploit
this incongruence.
Methods of providing robustness against adversarial attacks
approximate the outer minimization problem from Eq. (1). To
our knowledge, state-of-the-art methods of resisting adversarial
attacks currently revolve around either adversarial training
[11], [13], [18] or randomized smoothing [12].
Madry et al. [13] investigated using both the FGSM and
PGD methods of generating adversarial examples, and the
effects of using these methods to train networks, a tech-
nique called adversarial training. Note that, under adversar-
ial training, a network is consistently trained based on its
worst performance point in the neighborhood of each input.
Madry et al. showed that adversarial training could reduce the
transferability of attacks between different networks, but only
slightly [13]. They also argued that any defense mechanism
shown to be robust against PGD would be robust against
other first-order attacks [13]. That group later expanded their
4theories on adversarial training in work by Tsipras et al.
[11], demonstrating salient features materializing in adversarial
examples with large limits on allowed attacks. These attacks
used perturbation magnitudes which greatly surpassed the
threshold at which the classifier’s accuracy would necessarily
change, but for the first time demonstrated that classifiers could
potentially be used to alter input images, adding or subtracting
salient features.
Cohen et al. [12] recently improved on a body of work
called randomized smoothing, a provable method of inducing
L2 robustness based on evaluating a smoothed version of a
network trained with Gaussian noise. Unlike techniques such
as Madry et al.’s [13] or our work in Section III, Cohen et al.’s
method allows for a certifiable calculation of an adversarial
resistance bound. That is, there may or may not be attacks
against networks that exist, but are difficult to find with
PGD. If these attacks exist, Cohen et al.’s method provides
a high level of confidence that the smoothed network would
also protect against them, even though these attacks cannot
currently be generated. The price of this certainty comes
with somewhat inflated processing time: predicting requires
about 100 evaluations for each input to properly compute the
smoothing function [12].
Other defensive techniques have been proposed but were
either inadequately tested or shown to be broken. An approach
which denoised inputs won the NeurIPS 2017 adversarial
robustness challenge [19], [20], which was successful but
defended against a static set of attacks targeted at a standard
network rather than against attacks specific to the defended net-
work. A number of stochastic and non-differentiable defenses
have been proposed and subsequently shown to be vulnerable
to attacks which take these qualities into account [9]. Still other
defense papers have focused on defense against specifically
single-step attacks [21], were marginally less effective versions
of the previously mentioned, state-of-the-art approaches [22],
or focused on the natural defensive qualities of different
architectures rather than ways of improving their defenses [23].
We note that a roundup of best-practices for ensuring that
new defenses are effective was recently authored by Carlini
et al. [24]. In the context of the current work, we’ve complied
with many of their recommendations, excepting non-gradient
based attacks and an investigation of attack transferability. As
our proposed techniques only affect network regularization
(Section III) or make gradients less obfuscated (Section III-D),
sticking to a gradient-based PGD-variant attack seemed suffi-
cient. Attack transferability was not investigated as the pro-
posed models have identical architectures and processing, and
therefore, for a given input, increasing the required attack
perturbation magnitude necessitates that an attack would not
transfer.
For comparing adversarial defense techniques, the current
work used accuracy-versus-attack-magnitude plots, such as
Fig. 3. This type of plot shows how an individual classifier’s
accuracy would fall as the allowable attack space, S from
Eq. (1), is increased. For consistency across datasets, regardless
of their input dimensions, we used the Root-Mean-Squared
Error (RMSE) for the shown attack distances, which is equal
to the L2 norm of the perturbation divided by the square root
of the number of elements in the perturbation. The RMSE is
a more natural choice as it is scaled such that an RMSE of 0
means no change and an RMSE of 1 means the change between
an all-black and all-white image, regardless of size. Figures
shown in this work have scaled e.g.  and other values reported
in other works to the RMSE scale. Cohen et al. [12] presented
this plot for L2 attacks against both ImageNet and CIFAR-10
results, and Madry et al. [13] presented this plot for L2 attacks
against a CIFAR-10 classifier with 10× the normal number of
filters and trained against Linf adversarial examples. Personal
communication with A. Madry yielded the additional curve on
Fig. 3, which was for a standard CIFAR-10 ResNet-50 trained
against L2 attacks with  = 0.009; we independently trained
a similar network using their methods and achieved similar
results, and show improved results for adversarial training with
a slightly different adversary (Section IV-B15).
To compare these curves using a single number, we’ve used
the area between the curves of a naive classifier and the
classifier in question, a metric we’ve termed the classifier’s
Accuracy-Robustness Area (ARA). A larger ARA value is
desirable. The ARA is illustrated in Fig. 3b, where the shaded
area for each classifier is the area computed for the ARA.
Intuitively, the ARA measures a combination of the classifier’s
predictive power and its ability to overcome an adversary. Im-
portantly, when constrasted against existing robustness metrics,
the ARA takes into account the classifier’s performance against
all adversarial examples, without bounding them by some
arbitrary . For triangular shapes such as those in Fig. 3, where
the accuracy smoothly declines from the classifier’s accuracy
on clean data to the naive classification baseline at some point,
the ARA is about equal to 12S(A−N), or half the product of S,
the adversarial perturbation magnitude at which the classifier
has no predictive power, and the difference between A, the
classifier’s clean accuracy, and N , a naive classifier’s accuracy
on the problem. Thus, when clean accuracies are identical, a
network with an ARA 3× larger than another network’s ARA
indicates that the first network retains predictive power against
adversaries which produce 3× more noise than where the sec-
ond network would fail. For a more realistic example, consider
Fig. 3b. The curve “Madry et al. personal comm.” has a clean
accuracy of 90.9 % and loses its predictive powers against
an adversary with S ≈ 0.03, and an ARA calculation yields
0.0124 (note that 12 (0.03)(0.909− 0.1) = 0.0121). The curve
“Our ResNet-44” has a clean accuracy of 68.4 % and loses its
predictive powers at S ≈ 0.07, and an ARA calculation yields
0.0197 (here 12 (0.07)(0.684 − 0.1) = 0.0204). The crossover
point – at which our ResNet-44 becomes more accurate than
the adversarially-trained classifier from Madry et al. – occurs
when attack magnitudes exceed S ≈ 0.013. See Fig. S4 for
an example of different perturbation magnitudes; generally, an
RMSE of 0.013 would be indistinguishable from the original
input.
We found that, on CIFAR-10, a standard ResNet-44 had an
ARA of 0.0013, extrapolating numbers from Madry et al.’s
best L2 resistant network (from personal communication)
yielded the aforementioned ARA of 0.0124, and Cohen et al.’s
numbers yield an ARA of 0.0065. A reproduction of Madry
et al.’s best L2 resistant network, but as a ResNet-44 instead
5of ResNet-50 and using our algorithm for evaluating ARA
in Section III-A1, yielded an ARA of 0.0104. On ImageNet
2012, a standard ResNet-18 had an ARA of 0.0004 and Cohen
et al.’s method resulted in an ARA of 0.0022. We note that,
to the best of our knowledge, Madry et al.’s [11], [13] group
has not yet produced a robust network on the full ImageNet
challenge.
B. Explanation Methods
Inadequate understanding of the internal operation of NNs,
or the larger toolbox of ML solutions in general, has recently
come under focus as a primary difficulty of using them [4],
[5], [25]–[28]. Preliminary attempts at addressing this problem
involved looking at saliency maps computed via backpropaga-
tion to see which input pixels had the largest effect on the
classification [25], [29] or looking at the receptive fields to
which internal nodes respond [27], [30]–[32]. However, these
techniques often produce very noisy images that are difficult
to interpret, and have been shown to be fragile explanations in
the presence of adversarial examples [33].
Works such as Ribeiro et al.’s Local Interpretable Model-
Agnostic Explanations (LIME) [5] or Selvaraju et al.’s
Gradient-weighted Class Activation Mapping (Grad-CAM) [4]
proposed improvements over raw saliency maps. LIME is a
generalized method suitable for both image and non-image
inputs that boils down to set theory: if part of the input were
masked, would the overall classification get better or worse?
By noting which parts of the input make the most significant
difference, the LIME algorithm derives a linear classifier which
approximates the non-linear NN, and the linear, approximating
classifier is then used to produce a mask for the input that
highlights salient regions [5]. On the other hand, the Grad-
CAM algorithm harnesses backpropagation directly to derive
an expression for localizing the most salient regions [4]. Its
innovation came from measuring image region contribution at
a layer closer to the classifying end of the NN than the input.
Both of these ultimately used linearization techniques in an
attempt to describe the non-linear NN’s behavior.
These algorithms produced reasonable explanations for the
examples provided in their papers [4], [5]. The paper proposing
LIME additionally presented a convincing argument that accu-
racy alone may not be representative of a classifier’s quality,
and explanations can highlight generalization errors caused
by artifacts within the original dataset [5]. However, neither
the LIME nor Grad-CAM algorithms account for non-linear
network behaviors, and the corresponding papers did not speak
to their validity outside of the exact input being evaluated. To
further test the validity of Grad-CAM and LIME for explaining
NNs, which are highly non-linear by design, we considered
the relation between explanations and adversarial examples: if
a method explaining an NN’s decision were reliable, then an
adversarial example should primarily change the regions of the
image marked salient by the explainer.
This theory was tested on the lung nodule dataset published
by the Japanese Society of Radiological Technology (JSRT).
This dataset consists of 247 chest X-rays, 154 of which have
a single, annotated nodule, each of which show up as dark,
(a) (b) (c)
Fig. 4: A demonstration of LIME on an NN diagnosing lung nodules in the
JSRT dataset. LIME’s algorithm consists of taking an input (a), dividing it up
into super-pixels (b), and then using linear approximations to determine which
subset of super-pixels most significantly affects the network’s classification (c).
How well does this explain the decision?
(a) (b)
CNN Decision
Backpropagate to find
"direction" reinforcing
class decision.
Compute regions
which support class.
(c)
Fig. 5: Selvaraju et al.’s Grad-CAM [4] processes an input (a), uses back-
propagation to produce localized gradient information (b), and presents that
information as a heat map of salient regions (c). How well does this explain
the decision?
solitary shadows. Chest X-rays are notoriously difficult to
read, and so the JSRT dataset is evaluated by nominating 5
candidate points which might be proximal to a tumor. An
algorithm’s output is considered correct if a tumor center is
within 2.5 cm, or 143 px, of any such candidate point. Scores
are thus presented as sensitivity given at most 5 false positives
per X-ray. We trained a network on this problem which scored
66% sensitivity by this rubric and applied LIME and Grad-
CAM to the NN, yielding Fig. 4 and Fig. 5 respectively.
Considering the output of LIME for this classifier, Fig. 4, we
see that the produced explanation neither makes intuitive sense
nor instills confidence in the classifier. For the same network,
Grad-CAM produces a smoother, more intuitive explanation
(Fig. 5). One could reasonably infer from this explanation
that the network assigned saliency to the high-contrast borders
of the nodule, a reasonable approach for the problem. How-
ever, this human-oriented interpretation of Grad-CAM’s output
seems unrepresentative of the network’s actual operation: when
compared with the adversarial example generated for the same
NN in Fig. 6, there is no correlation in overlap between the
adversarial perturbations and the salient region demarked by
Grad-CAM. As such, we posit that the explanations yielded
by LIME and Grad-CAM do not reliably represent dominant
factors contributing to the NN’s output. While LIME and Grad-
CAM have sound theory, they both rely on linearizations of a
highly non-linear network, and an imperceptible change in the
input invalidates the entire explanation from either algorithm.
Attention models involve modifying the NN’s architecture to
60.97 non-nodule
(a)
= 0.96 nodule
(b)
+ noise ×2.1e− 03
(RMSE 0.0014)
(c)
Fig. 6: An adversarial example corresponding to the same network and input
as Figs. 4 and 5. Here, the resulting adversarial input (a) is the sum of the
original input (b) and a crafted noise term scaled by a small coefficient (c).
The result is an imperceptible change in input leading to a completely different
NN output. Also worth noting is that the location of the noise in (c) does not
correlate well with either the LIME or Grad-CAM explanations.
both enhance overall NN performance and provide an attention
mask which may be viewed as an explanation mechanism [34],
[35]. Where saliency maps demonstrate the most-used pixels,
attention models use a gating technique which involves multi-
plying the inputs by a learned mask to shape how inputs are
forwarded to the classifying portion of the network. Viewing
the mask of the attention model shows which inputs were
weighted more heavily for a given input. However, attention
models are still vulnerable to adversarial attacks which exploit
only a small portion of the masked region. Jetley et al. [36]
analyzed their attention masks in relation to FGSM adversarial
attacks, and found only very marginal benefits.
Also noteworthy is Bau et al.’s “Network Dissection” work
[27]. By cross-referencing the activation map of convolu-
tional neurons in an NN with object annotations, an IoU
was computed on a per-neuron basis. They reasoned that
neurons relating to objects via a large IoU were responsible for
detecting that type of object or texture. However, the reported
IoUs are quite small, with the majority of reported values
being below 0.2—higher than coincidence, but lower than an
authoritative explanation would merit. Bau et al. also made no
mention of how adversarial examples relate to their work. The
approach is worth continued research, but is not yet an end-
all means of explaining NNs. More recently, Bau et al. have
applied their dissection methods to GANs, and demonstrated
that omitting neurons with high IoUs in GANs can predictably
modify the generated images [37], lending evidence that per-
neuron explanations might also be feasible in a correctly-
formulated classification network.
C. Lipschitz Continuity
Briefly, Lipschitz continuity is the bounding of a function’s
value, such that the function’s value is not allowed to change
between two points more than a constant value times the
distance between those points. This is often approximated as
a global bounding of the derivative.
Prior work has combined Lipschitz continuity with NNs.
Weng et al. [38] proposed analyzing the stability of NNs
using a metric derived from gradient measurements at different
data points, which they claimed was analogous to a Lipschitz
constraint. However, their method comprised of sampling the
gradient at different data points, a linearization which provided
no guarantees about behavior between those points, a flaw
similar to those we mentioned regarding LIME and Grad-
CAM. They also never attempted to control the gradients or
assess a causal relationship between the gradient magnitude
and a network’s robustness, instead focusing on a correlative
argument. Cisse et al. [39] implemented their Parseval net-
works by restraining the Lipschitz constant of each individual,
weighted layer to be less than 1. In that work, it was found
that adding the Lipschitz constraint made NNs negligibly
more resistant to attacks, with the Parseval network’s accuracy
falling at much the same rate as a vanilla network’s as attacks
of larger magnitude were allowed [39]. Behrmann et al. [40]
proposed that bounding the per-layer Lipschitz constraint of
an NN to 1 resulted in beneficial invertibility properties, but
did not analyze the effect of that bound on the network’s
adversarial robustness.
We differ from prior work in this area as we consider
the entirety of the NN as subject to end-to-end Lipschitz
constraints, rather than each layer individually. We propose
a novel Lipschitz constraint form which, rather than assigning
an upper limit, aggressively minimizes the Lipschitz constraint.
We demonstrate this technique as providing significant resis-
tance against adversarial examples, using a metric which ac-
counts for non-linearities in gradient behavior. We also propose
several other modifications to NNs, which complement the
practical minimization of a Lipschitz bound for NNs.
D. Active Learning
While we have demonstrated that heat maps are poor
indicators of a robust explanation, they have been proven
useful for active learning. Li et al.’s “Tell Me Where To
Look” [41] demonstrates the merit of using annotated salient
regions—a straightforward method of providing active learning
functionality—as part of weakly-supervised training for NNs.
They introduced an algorithm which extends Grad-CAM’s
heat map to be differentiable, and then used gradient descent
so that the highlighted region approaches that of annotated
segmentations on a classification dataset. This method could be
considered a proof-of-concept for active learning applications
based on NN explanations, where each new human annotation
ultimately becomes part of the training set for the algorithm.
For segmentation, their algorithm resulted in an impressive
leap from a mean Intersection-over-Union (IoU) of 0.555
with prior methods to 0.621 with theirs [41]. Additionally,
for 10,000 classification training examples, they only used
segmentation masks for 1,464 of the examples [41], illustrating
that even partial annotations provided some benefit.
Ribeiro et al. [5] used LIME in an active learning context by
providing operators, who were unfamiliar with machine learn-
ing, explanations on factors salient to a classifier’s decision.
They first created classifiers that identified whether the topic
from a text document was “Atheism” or “Christianity,” from a
dataset of 20 newsgroups. Operators on Amazon Mechanical
Turk were then shown explanations created via LIME, and
7marked the words which LIME determined were salient but
which should not have been relevant to the task. New classifiers
were then trained on a modified version of the dataset, which
did not include the words deemed irrelevant by operators. This
process was repeated several times, with an average of 200
words being removed between the original dataset and the
final classifier; Ribeiro et al. did not mention the number of
words in the original dataset. The real world accuracy of the
classifiers improved from a baseline of approximately 57 %
to approximately 70 % when the instances being explained
were chosen randomly; they also proposed an instance-picking
algorithm which boosted this performance further to 73 %.
Importantly, this experiment demonstrated that active learning
processes could be used to significantly improve classifiers
after few iterations.
We explored an alternative active learning pipeline to im-
prove the adversarial resistance of an NN, instead of improving
accuracy. As there is no image-oriented analog for removing
entire words from a dataset, we instead focused on introducing
new training data. As far as we are aware, we are the first to
generate new training data from existing training data as part
of an active learning pipeline. While the adversarial training
of Madry et al. [13], or even standard data augmentations,
could be viewed as introducing new data, both of those are
implemented with perturbations designed not to change the
underlying true class of data points. In contrast, we relied
on AEs with magnitudes sufficient to change the underlying
class, necessitating human input. Our active learning process
is outlined in Section III-H.
III. METHODS
Adversarial examples in state-of-the-art networks, as in
Fig. 6, do little to explain the inner workings of the NN
for which they are generated. However, the potential exists
for adversarial examples to be a very powerful, non-linear
method of explanation. Tsipras et al. [11] demonstrated that
non-minimal adversarial examples contained salient features
when networks were adversarially trained. Here, non-minimal
means adversarial examples which have not been optimized
for minimal perturbation distance, but only for maximal loss
on the objective function. The current work considers whether
decision boundaries may be pushed out even further, such
that minimal adversarial examples at class boundaries might
demonstrate the removal of features salient to the original
classification. While previous methods of explaining NNs rely
on linearization techniques, adversarial examples make full use
of the NN’s non-linearities. With targeted attacks, the boundary
located could signify different salient aspects of the input
stimulus, as in Figs. 1 and 2, if the decision manifold of the
network were sufficiently congruent with the visual manifold.
A practical demonstration of this theory may be seen through
examples on the JSRT dataset in Figs. 7 and 8; these were
implemented using the techniques described throughout this
section.
We will first discuss our method of generating and evaluat-
ing both adversarial attacks and explanations in Section III-A.
Following that, the methods used to train robust NNs may be
0.75 non-nodule
(a)
= 0.66 nodule
(b)
+ noise ×6.9e− 03
(RMSE 0.0103)
(c)
Fig. 7: In contrast to Fig. 6, our preliminary technique of increasing adversarial
distance concentrates the perturbations needed to change the network’s output.
The RMSE (c) between the original input (a) and the adversarial attack (b) is
also much greater for a smaller change in network output.
0.75 nodule
(a)
= 0.66 nodule
(b)
+ noise ×1.7e− 02
(RMSE 0.0113)
(c)
Fig. 8: Example of emphasizing a lung nodule via the same method of
adversarial attack. Same network as Fig. 7.
found in Sections III-B to III-H, and finally a discussion of the
datasets used in this work and the NN architectures chosen for
those datasets is found in Section III-I.
A. Adversarial Attack Generation and Evaluation
Adversarial attacks were conducted with two separate goals
within this paper: Section III-A1 contains the methodology
for adversarial attacks aimed at reducing the classification
accuracy of a network, and Section III-A2 contains the method-
ology for adversarial attacks aimed at producing classification
explanations.
1) Adversarial Attacks on Accuracy: Untargeted adver-
sarial attack generation for the evaluation of models followed
Algorithm 1; this was a variant of Carlini et al. [15], and also
leveraged normalizing gradient steps by their magnitude, first
proposed by Rony et al. [42] in the context of adversarial
attacks. Rather than pursuing both target loss maximization
and L2 error minimization simultaneously, we found that
alternating between these two to traverse some restriction on
the adversarial example’s network output allowed for better au-
tomatic balancing between the two errors, resulting in smaller
perturbation magnitudes. In contrast to the attacks presented
by Carlini et al. [15], the algorithm presented will not begin
a magnitude refinement before the target classification error is
reached. The threshold at which Algorithm 1 switches between
minimizing the correct class’ post-softmax prediction st and
minimizing the attack magnitude is defined by g(s, t).
8Algorithm 1: Process used to generate adversarial examples.
Input: N , the number of attack-optimizing steps; f(·), the NN; x, the
network input; t, the true class of the input; o(·), an optimizing
method such as SGD with momentum; g(s, t), a goal function
returning true if the network outputs from the attack are suitably
different from the true class t; η, a balancing term between
categorical loss and MSE loss.
Output: δbest, the adversarial noise which satisfies the goal g(·) and
has minimal vector length.
1 begin
2 δ ← ~0
3 Mbest ← inf
4 for n ∈ [0, ..., N − 1] do
5 xˆ← c(x+ δ) // c(·) clips elements of its
argument to a valid input range, e.g. [0, 1]
6 y ← f(xˆ)
7 s← softmax(y)
8 if g(s, t) then
9 ∆δ ← 2δ // L2 loss for magnitude
10 if ||δ||2 < Mbest then
11 Mbest ← ||δ||2
12 δbest ← δ
13 else
14 ∆δ ← ∂st/∂(x+ δ)
15 ∆δ ← η ∆δ||∆δ||2 // Fixed gradient magnitude
16 δ ← o(δ,∆δ) // Apply optimizer step
We present two choices of g(s, t) for the current work. The
first, gadv(s, t), was the well-known adversarial attack metric
used by all prior work in this field [11], [12], and denotes the
boundary at which top-1 accuracy would decrease:
gadv(s, t) =
{
1 if st −maxj(sj ; j 6= t) < 0,
0 otherwise.
(2)
This was the g(s, t) used to produce Fig. 3. When ARA
values are reported for a model, we evaluated random valida-
tion or testing images until we had 1,000 which were correctly
classified. We then made a list of the RMSEs below which each
image would retain the correct classification, minimized as per
Algorithm 1. This list was extended with 0s for each image
evaluated which was initially incorrectly classified: if a model
scored 70 % classification accuracy on unmodified images, we
would have a final RMSE list of about 1,429 in length, 1,000 of
which were non-zero. This list was then evaluated for accuracy
at different levels of RMSE, as seen in Fig. 3, and the area
above the naive baseline was taken to produce the attack ARA
metric.
In the context of Algorithm 1, we used N = 450, o(·) was a
Stochastic Gradient Descent (SGD) optimizer with a learning
rate of 0.01 and momentum 0.9, and η = 0.55. Examples
of our attack against a regular JSRT network can be seen in
Fig. 6, and against a regular CIFAR-10 ResNet-44 network in
Fig. 15.
2) Adversarial Attacks as Explanations: In the context of
explanations, however, we found the gadv(s, t) metric to be
lacking. The decision boundary was not always sufficiently
distant from the data point to reveal salient features. Instead,
donut 0.14
sandwich 0.09
(a) Original
donut 0.84
...sandwich 0.01
(b) Donut gexplain+
fire hydrant 0.97
...sandwich 0.00
(c) Donut gexplain−
sandwich 0.47
hot dog 0.11
(d) Sandwich gexplain+
sports ball 1.00
...sandwich 0.00
(e) Sandwich gexplain−
horse 0.36
...sandwich 0.01
(f) Horse gexplain+
Fig. 9: Different explanation techniques using ρ = 0.075. (a) The original
image. (b) A positive explanation for the donut class; we note alignment of
the added “hole” with a wrinkle in the original sandwich bun. (c) A negative
explanation for the donus class resulted in the removal of the round shape of
the sandwich. (d) A positive explanation for the true class, sandwich, results
in exposed contents (peppers or tomatoes), and the beginnings of lettuce.
(e) A negative explanation for the sandwich class reveals homogenization of
the bun’s texture, and further rounding out of the overall shape. (f) Positive
explanation for a completely unrelated class, horse: legs were clearly added,
and the textured area in the upper-left of the image is appropriated as a saddle.
we targeted an amount of perceptual difference between the
explanation and the original input, optimizing the shape of
the perturbation for that which would maximally impact the
network’s output in a desired manner. Comparing these ex-
planations with the original input then demonstrates precisely
which features would lead to a desired output. This was
accomplished by following ∂st/∂(x + δ) up to a boundary
RMSE, at which point the RMSE would be minimized, a tick-
tock method similar to Algorithm 1, but substituting a slightly
different boundary criteria:
gexplain+(δ; ρ) =
{
1 if ||δ|| > ρ,
0 otherwise.
(3)
We note that gexplain− is also possible, by modifying
Algorithm 1 to maximize the selected class loss rather than
minimizing it. These techniques are demonstrated in Fig. 9. A
more detailed analysis of interpreting the resulting AE images
is provided in the results, Section IV-A.
Quantitatively, the attack ARA was not found to be indica-
tive of the quality of these explanations. For example, consider
two closely related classes from CIFAR-10: automobile and
truck. These classes are often confused for one another, leading
to a decrease in the magnitude of untargeted attacks for
members of either class. With respect to the network’s ability
to tell these two apart, gadv remains a good metric. However, as
9Fig. 10: The previously mentioned attack ARA metric depends on the relative
confidence between the correct class and the second-most-confident class. For
related classes such as “car” and “truck,” the distance between these two
classes may not increase through training. However, by measuring the distance
from the correct class back to a fixed baseline, as is done with the BTR ARA
metric, improvements in feature recognition may be measured regardless of
the presence of related classes.
a classifier learns to distinguish these related classes from the
other unrelated classes, the sj corresponding to these related
classes might rise in tandem. The described phenomenon is
illustrated in Fig. 10. This situation would indicate that the
network possesses a greater capacity for deciding what is
“automobile” or “truck” compared to the remaining classes, but
the attack magnitude would not decrease as these two classes
would still be easily confused. Since the confusion between
these two classes is built into the problem, gadv hits a ceiling
beyond which an attack magnitude based on the gadv metric
cannot be improved. As such, we also considered Better Than
Random (BTR) as a measure of the classifier’s knowledge
of class-specific features. The BTR magnitudes were defined
based on the distance between the classifier’s prediction and
a prediction at which the true label’s valuation matches that
of a random classifier. As shown in Fig. 10, the BTR quantity
continues to increase even as related classes both become more
confident predictions. Thus, gbtr (where V is the number of
classes in the prediction) is defined as:
gbtr(s, t) =
{
1 if st < 1V ,
0 otherwise.
(4)
We note that the numerical stability of BTR is guaranteed,
as resetting all pre-softmax outputs to 0 achieves the required
condition. The BTR ARA gracefully degrades into that attack
ARA on binary classification problems. Note also that we
deliberately chose a truly random classifier, and not a naive
classifier, for unbalanced datasets (such as the Microsoft
COCO dataset, Section III-I3). When calculating BTR ARA
metrics from a population of adversarial examples created
using gbtr, a naive classifier was still used as the baseline for
the area calculation.
3) Example ARA Metrics: For a traditional ImageNet
ResNet-18, we measured an attack ARA of 0.0004 and a BTR
ARA of 0.0013. For a CIFAR-10 ResNet-44, we measured an
attack ARA of 0.0013 and a BTR ARA of 0.0014. An intuitive
sense of attack ARAs may be gathered from Appendix A, and
BTR ARAs are compared in Appendices B, D and E.
B. Defense via Lipschitz Continuity
An integral part of many white-box attacks, including Al-
gorithm 1, involves following the gradient of some loss. The
rate at which the output of the network might be changed is
likewise dependent on that gradient. To see how this might
affect classification networks, consider the softmax operation,
here denoted as s(·), applied to the output of an NN, y:
s(y) =
ey∑V
i=1 e
yi
. (5)
In the 1,000-class ImageNet Large Scale Visual Recognition
Competition 2012 (ILSVRC 2012) challenge, there are 1,000
classes [43]. Assuming 999 of those classes have an NN
output of yi = 0, then a value for the remaining class of
yj = 10 corresponds to a confidence in class j of 95.7 %. For
a confidence of 4.3 %, that value need only fall to yj = 3.8. In
reality, an adversarial attack also has the option of increasing
the confidence of classes i 6= j to reduce confidence of class
j. If yj = 3.8, and another yk = 6.2, k 6= j, then the
confidence of class j falls to 2.9 % and class k skyrockets
to 32.1 %. In other words, instability on the output values
will quickly overwhelm the softmax operation. If we assume
locally-linear behavior of the network, this instability may be
modeled by looking at the expected change in the network’s
output given some gradient information. Using Ei [·] to denote
an expectation conditioned on i, N as the number of input
elements, ∆ to signify an actual value change, and ∂ to signify
a variable’s partial:
Ei [|∆yi|] ≈ Ei
∣∣∣∣∣∣
N∑
j=1
∆xj
∂yi
∂xj
∣∣∣∣∣∣
 , (6)
/
N∑
j=1
Ei,j
[∣∣∣∣∆xj ∂yi∂xj
∣∣∣∣] , (7)
These quantities are neither independent nor equivalent,
but we will simplify them as such:
E [|∆yi|] / NE [|∆xj |]E
[∣∣∣∣ ∂yi∂xj
∣∣∣∣] . (8)
Equation (8) provides a loose guideline for targeting differ-
ent values of |∂yi/∂x|. In fact, as a network becomes more
non-linear, Eq. (8) becomes less accurate.
To see how effective the guideline given by Eq. (8) was in
practice, we built a ResNet-18 and trained it on ILSVRC 2012
training data, detailed in Section III-I2. Leveraging PyTorch’s
automated differential engine, we collected gradients for one
of the NN’s outputs, before the softmax, with respect to each
of the 150,528 input elements (224 · 224 · 3). The mean
absolute value of the computed derivatives then resulted in an
aggregate number which summarized the network’s volatility
in the original input space. For our ResNet-18, this value
worked out to 0.051 /input. Interestingly, the mean of the
maximum absolute derivative per image was a much larger
3.9 /input, indicating a large spread in these values. Attacks
were generated against this network with a 50 % confidence
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margin in favor of an adversarial class. Again, based on a local-
linearity assumption, the magnitudes of these attacks were
measured as the mean absolute difference per pixel between the
original and attacked images. The harmonic mean of the mean
absolute distances of all such attacks against this network was
found to be 0.0033 /input; according to Eq. (8), the sum of
∆yi between the true and adversarially targeted classes should
then be less than 50.7. The actual measured sum of ∆yi across
the true and target classes averaged 26.1.
The change in network output was shown in Eq. (8) to
be bounded proportionally to the gradient of the output with
respect to each input element, as long as local network
behavior was linear. Since this assumption seemed to hold for
real networks, we theorized that limiting this gradient would
therefore provide some adversarial resistance in these linear
regions of the network by forcing additional non-linearities
to compensate for the limitation. This is a form of Lipschitz
continuity, as discussed in Section II-C. From another point of
view, limiting |∂yi/∂xj | makes each training element a stable
point for the network, enforcing a neighborhood of validity for
each decision. The classification loss then enforces necessary
non-linearities between these stable regions. As such, this
work’s primary contribution is to explore the relation between
limiting E[|∂yi/∂xj |] and adversarial attacks. In the context
of Eq. (1), this moves the focus from attempting to solve
the outer minimization equation directly to instead limiting
the effects of traveling in the allowed attack space S. We
note that, particularly with the Rectified Linear Unit (ReLU)
activation function, even a gradient of ~0 does not guarantee
a neighborhood of validity; see Section III-G concerning that
issue.
For networks with 1,000 outputs, minimizing |∂yi/∂xj |
directly for all i is computationally prohibitive - each train-
ing image processed would require 1,000 additional gradient
propagations. Instead, we use a regularizing loss which is
stochastically defined with a scaling parameter ψ and a power
factor z:
vk ∼ [1, 2, ..., V ],
Ladv,z =
ψ
KN
K∑
k=1
N∑
j=1
∣∣∣∣∂yvk∂xj
∣∣∣∣z . (9)
Equation (9) therefore draws K random indices (without
replacement) from the available output nodes and minimizes
the derivative of each selected output with respect to all
inputs. Backpropagation makes this an efficient computation
regardless of the number of input elements. When K = V ,
Ladv,z ceases to be stochastic. K and N are both included in
the denominator such that the expected force per image relative
to the classification loss is maintained regardless of the number
of inputs or outputs. Sections IV-B2 and IV-B3 demonstrates
the effects both of the relative strength of this loss, through
changing ψ, and by varying its stochasticity, through changing
K.
In addition to investigating the absolute value form of
Eq. (9), using |∂ynk/∂xj |z , we investigated instead minimiz-
ing Ladv,z,q =
(∑N
l=1 |∂ynk/∂xl|
)q
|∂ynk/∂xj |z for some
values of z and q. We included these to illustrate that the
proposed regularization technique is in fact a rich family of
techniques based on approximations of which quantities are
relevant for adversarial defense; a limited investigation of these
metaparameters is found in Section IV-B13. From this point
forward we will use Ladv to refer to any of these, with default
values of z = 2 and q = 0 unless otherwise specified.
We also considered the effects of creating a “dead zone”
where gradients would not be punished, like a true Lipschitz
constraint. For these experiments, instead of minimizing based
on |∂ynk/∂xj | directly, Ladv would be minimized based on
max(|∂ynk/∂xj | − δ, 0). Results are found in Section IV-B6.
It is also possible for nk to be drawn from a non-uniform
distribution. To test the merits of this, we considered distribu-
tions which yielded the correct label ζ% of the time and were
pulled from a random distribution (including the correct label)
the rest of the time. Results with this technique are discussed
in Sections IV-B8 and IV-B14.
Another variant of non-uniform distribution involved sub-
stituting the minimization of the true class’ gradient ζ% of
the time for minimizing the gradient (∂yt−maxi 6=t∂yi)/∂xj ,
the difference between the true class and the maximum non-
true class prediction. This regularization, which we label
Ladv,tandem because it aligns the gradients of two different
classes in tandem, was chosen based on the “automobile” vs
“truck” discussion from Section III-A2. While regularizing
only one class at a time guarantees that the gradient for that
class will approach zero, this provides an opportunity for a
related class to dominate. Since the softmax operation assigns
probabilities based on the difference between elements of its
input, it was determined that it might be more effective to reg-
ularize the difference between those inputs (the NN’s output).
Results for this technique are presented in Section IV-B14.
C. Gradient Minimization as Weight Regularization
Exploring analogs to minimizing |∂yi/∂xj | further, consider
a single layer of an NN:
~y = f(A~x+~b),
∂~y
∂~x
=
∂f(·)
∂· A. (10)
Assuming all paths are active and we’re using a ReLU
network, then ∂f(·)/∂· = 1. Since we would then use the
element-wise absolute value or square of each element of A
to devise our adversarial loss function Ladv , this is identical to
L1 or L2 regularization for q = 0, z ∈ {1, 2}. While in a multi-
layer setup, the proposed Ladv diverges from standard weight
regularization, we considered it worthwhile to run experi-
ments with weight regularization disabled on the convolutional
weights in the network (keeping it enabled on biases within
the network). These are explored in Section IV-B10.
D. Half-Huber Rectified Linear Unit (HHReLU)
A classical ReLU is continuous in value, but its derivative is
discontinuous. Our proposal required optimizing the derivative
11
of the activation functions used by the network, and as such we
desired the first derivative to be continuous, allowing that the
second derivative might be discontinuous. Related to the Huber
function, we devised a new activation function, the Half-Huber
ReLU (HHReLU), defined as:
f(x) =

0, x < 0,
dx2, x < 12d
x− 14d , otherwise.
(11)
While the parameter d describes the acceleration of the x2
region, for timely results, we did not explore this parameter
outside of d = 1. Nonetheless, we note that other values
of d or other activation functions with a continuous first
derivative might be explored further in the future. The impact
of using this activation function instead of a traditional ReLU
is explored in Section IV-B7.
E. Output Zeroing
The softmax function, Eq. (5), is translation-invariant with
respect to its inputs. We found that, in practice, allowing net-
works to rely on the invariance of the softmax function resulted
in the flattening effects of Ladv persisting classification errors
within the network. For instance, assume a two-class NN,
which is producing output y0 = 1, y1 = 2 for some input.
The adversarial resistance loss from Eq. (9) induces a certain
amount of inertia about y0 = 1, y1 = 2, making it harder for
the network to switch the ordering of these outputs. Adding
an additional L2 regularization term for the pre-softmax output
of the network biases all of these terms toward 0, easing the
classification task:
Lout = kout
∑
i
y2i . (12)
If kout is too large, then the network will never gain any
confidence in its answers. Too small a kout and the benefits will
disappear. Therefore, similar to the guidelines on |∂yi/∂xi|
established by Eq. (8), we provide some guideline calculations
regarding the balancing of these two forces while considering
the maximum learnable confidence when training with a cross-
entropy loss L(·) (using V as the number of possible classes):
Assume yz = 0, where z 6= t,
L(~y) = −log(st), si = e
yi
eyi + V − 1 ,
dL/dyt = st − 1. (13)
When the network’s predictions are an accurate distribution,
and examples are uniformly distributed, yi only has a 1/V
chance of being a large value and needing to contest the
classification loss. The rest of the time, it would only have a
1−si chance of being large for a confusing example. Balancing
the force of the cross-entropy loss, L(·), with Lout yields:
L
V
=
Lout
V
+
(V − 1)(1− st)Lout
V
,
1− st
V
=
kout2yt
V
+
(V − 1)(1− st)kout2yt
V
,
kout =
1− st
2yt(1 + (V − 1)(1− st)) . (14)
Equation (14), like Eq. (8), is not claimed to be an exact
equation. However, it gives a guideline for reasonable param-
eter values. We tried st = 0.8 for all experiments, yielding
kout = 0.01 for our CIFAR-10 experiments, kout = 6e − 5
for our ImageNet experiments, and kout = 1e − 3 for our
COCO experiments. Results of varying this parameter on the
CIFAR-10 dataset may be found in Section IV-B9.
F. Adaptive ψ
To ease comparisons between the meta-parameters necessary
for our proposed technique to work, we investigated setting ψ
from Eq. (9) automatically based on a targeted training loss.
We performed experiments using an integrating controller:
ψ = kψ,0e
kψ
∑
b c(− ln(Ltrain,b/Ltarget)), (15)
c(d) = clip(d,−worse, better),
where b is the batch index, Ltarget is the targeted training
loss, and Ltrain,b is the training loss for batch b. While
this approach still has one significant metaparameter, Ltarget,
the meaning of its value is consistent regardless of other
parameters. The other metaparameters for an adaptive ψ were
important only for guaranteeing that ψ changed slowly, over a
large number of batches. In all experiments, the regularization
proposed in this work was capable of matching Ltarget. Note
that the strength of ψ is based on the exponential of the
integral as we found this to work significantly better across
different scales of Ltarget, and throughout network training.
The inner summation of Eq. (15) was always prevented from
falling below zero, making kψ,0 the minimum strength.
Values used were typically kψ,0 = 220, kψ = 0.02,
better = 1, worse = 0.01, though early experiments used
kψ,0 = 0.01, worse = 1 (experiments before those discussed
in Section IV-B14).
G. Adversarial and Noisy Training
Section III-B mentioned that, even with gradients of ~0 at all
points in the training data, an activation function like ReLU
guarantees no neighborhood for which the gradient will remain
~0. That is, a loss “cliff” might be arbitrarily close to any
training point. This is partly due to the overparameterization
of NNs, illustrated in Fig. 11. As such, we also investigated
combining our method with either random Gaussian noise or
adversarial training.
Adversarial training was implemented two ways. In the first
way, denoted as L2, an L2 distance  was chosen and the
adversary attempted to find the highest loss value within that
-ball. The gradient of the classification cross-entropy loss
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Fig. 11: Training an NN on samples from a dataset (left) specifies desired
behavior at the data points, but does not describe behavior in between those
data points, allowing the decision surface to take an arbitrary shape. Adding
some noise (second from left) can somewhat improve the behavior between
dataset samples, but is statistically unlikely to improve the worst behaviors.
Adversarial training (second from right) deliberately attempts to improve the
worst performing points, leading to a smoother decision surface. Adding a
stochastic Lipschitz loss, as Eq. (9), further smooths behavior between data
points.
was followed for 7 steps, each time being normalized to /7
magnitude. This was very similar to the original adversarial
training approach proposed by Madry et al. [13]. In the second
way, minimal adversarial training denoted as L2,min, an L2
distance  was also chosen, but before taking each step, the
network’s classification was evaluated. If the network correctly
classified the example, then the gradient of classification
loss was normalized to length ψ7,n and followed, where
ψk,n = 2(k−n)/[k(k+1)] and n ∈ [0, 1, ..., k−1] is the index
of the step being taken. In this formulation, the step sizes at
subsequent steps yield progressively finer movements. If the
network incorrectly classified the example, then the gradient
was replaced with the negation of the current perturbation,
normalized to size ψ7,n, and followed. That is, the L2,min
method of adversarial training sought to train on adversarial
examples near the boundary at which the network would
misclassify those examples.
Training configurations where batches were composed of
half adversarial examples and half original examples from
the dataset were also considered. In Tsipras et al. [11], this
technique was called “Half-Half” training, and we keep that
nomenclature.
Neither of these guarantee that a loss cliff would be cor-
rected, but as seen in Section IV-B15, they both somewhat
alleviate the underlying problem. We also note that noise from
batch normalization and data augmentation should help with
this problem.
H. Active Learning
We explored using the adversarial examples generated from
our networks to bootstrap even better adversarial resistance
in an active learning pipeline with a User Interface (UI) as
shown in Fig. 12. The UI took a trained network and used
it to generate high-confidence adversarial examples. These
examples were also generated from Algorithm 1, but instead
with a high-confidence condition of g(s, t) = maxj(sj ; j 6=
t) − maxq(sq; q 6= j) > 0.5. That is, the adversarially
generated, incorrect class had to be 50 % more confident than
the next-highest class. Users were then presented with three
options: unchanged, unsure, and no longer the original class.
When any button was pressed, the adversarial image was saved
Fig. 12: Prototype active learning interface. Whereas adversarial training
simply generates adversarial examples and trains them to be recognized as
the original class, our adversarial explanations can be used for the generation
of sufficient quality samples to merit human intervention as to whether or not
the class of the image has changed.
along with the original label and the annotation. We then tested
re-training networks from scratch using the adversarial images
annotated as “unchanged” as part of the training data. While
this method of feedback was somewhat limited, we offer it as
a proof-of-concept that our method of producing adversarial
explanations could be used not only to inform the user about
the reasoning behind an algorithmic decision, but also to feed
annotations back into improving the classifier.
I. Architectures and Datasets
This section contains details on the architectures used for
the various datasets discussed in this document.
Note that all networks were evaluated based on their final
state during training - no validation set was used to cherry-pick
peak performance during training. Overfitting was not found to
be a problem in the traditional sense, a result consistent with
the original findings on residual networks [44].
1) CIFAR-10: CIFAR-10 is a commonly-used dataset with
50,000 training images and 10,000 test images, consisting of
32 × 32 RGB images belonging to one of 10 classes [45].
Our CIFAR-10 experiments were based on a ResNet-44 [44],
modified to be in pre-activation form [46] with each residual
block’s output convolution weights initialized to zero as per
[47]. Training used mini-batches of size 256 spread across
2 GPUs, for 128 images per GPU. We used standard data
augmentation techniques for this task, reflecting the bordering
4 pixels and taking a random 32 × 32 crop during training.
Training images were horizontally flipped 50 % of the time.
Stochastic Gradient Descent (SGD) was used to optimize
weights with a momentum of 0.9 and L2 weight regularization
with a strength of 1e − 4, starting at a learning rate of 0.02
which was linearly increased to 0.2 over the first 10 epochs.
The learning rate was then stepped down to 0.02 and 0.002 at
170 and 195 epochs, respectively. Training was halted at 200
epochs. This entire setup was implemented in PyTorch [48],
and resulted in a final top-1 validation accuracy of 92.2 % on
a network without other changes.
2) ILSVRC 2012: While CIFAR-10 is small enough to
iterate on quickly, success on CIFAR-10 does not guarantee
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the generality of a technique. Therefore, we also investigated
training on the ILSVRC 2012 dataset, consisting of 1,281,167
training and 50,000 validation RGB images of varying size
but significantly higher resolution than CIFAR-10, with objects
belonging to one of 1,000 classes [43]. We trained a ResNet-
18 [44] modified to be in pre-activation form [46] with each
residual block’s output convolution weights initialized to zero
as per [47]. To ease gradient descent with respect to the input
as discussed in Section III-B, we also replaced the initial
max pooling operation with an average pooling operation.
L2 regularization was applied to weights and biases with a
strength of 1e-4 . Training used mini-batches of size 192
spread across 3 GPUs, for 64 images per GPU. We used
standard data augmentation techniques for this task, resizing
the smallest edge of each image in [256, 480] and taking a
random 224 × 224 crop. Each crop was then given a 50 %
chance of being horizontally flipped. We skipped the standard
color augmentations. Rather than using the state-of-the-art
method of computing validation accuracy, which would have
involved a 10-crop on the validation phase [44], we instead
resized images such that the smallest edge was 256 pixels
across and then took a crop of the central 224 × 224 pixels
for validation. SGD was used to optimize weights with a
momentum of 0.9 and L2 weight regularization with a strength
of 1e − 4, starting at a learning rate of 0.03 and linearly
increased to 0.3 over the first 10 epochs. The learning rate was
then stepped down to 0.03 and 0.003 at 50 and 60 epochs,
respectively. Training was halted at 65 epochs. This entire
setup was implemented in PyTorch [48], and resulted in a final
top-1 validation accuracy of 65.6 % on a network without other
changes.
3) Microsoft COCO: The Common Objects in COntext
(COCO) dataset [49] was used as an additional proof-of-
concept. The dataset consists of images containing scenes of
multiple annotated objects from 80 different classes. To stick
to classification problems for demonstrating our methods, we
created a sub-dataset from COCO which consisted of taking
the bounding box of each annotated object as a separate input
example. During training, each object’s sub-image was resized
such that the smallest edge was between 96 and 120 pixels
long, selected a random 96×96 crop, and randomly performed
a horizontal flip. During validation, each object was resized
such that the smallest edge was 108 pixels long, and then the
central crop of 96×96 pixels was selected. This scheme often
led to images that overlap with the “person” classification, but
was sufficient as a proof-of-concept.
The base network used for COCO annotations was the same
ResNet-44 network from Section III-I1 as used CIFAR-10,
but with filters of size 32, 64, and 128 (twice the standard
width). Rather than the standard convolution for transforming
input data for the first residual block, we used a convolutional
layer with a kernel size of 4 and a stride of 3, which reduced
the image from 96 × 96 to 32 × 32. SGD was used with a
momentum of 0.9 and L2 weight regularization with a strength
of 1e−4, starting at a learning rate of 0.02 which was linearly
increased to 0.2 over the first 10 epochs. The learning rate was
then stepped down to 0.02 and 0.002 at 55 and 70 epochs,
respectively. Training was halted at 80 epochs. This entire
setup was implemented in PyTorch [48], and resulted in a
final top-1 validation accuracy of 77.4 % on a network without
other changes. We note that this accuracy was calculated on
imbalanced data. For example, the greatest imbalance in our
validation dataset was for the class “person,” which accounted
for 31.4 % of all objects in the dataset. In the context of
the other datasets used in this work, top-1 accuracy is an
easily-understood metric. We have therefore continued to use
that metric on COCO. The calculation of the attack ARA
(Section III-A1) and BTR ARA (Section III-A2) specify uses
of naive or random classifiers as appropriate to deal with the
imbalance in the COCO dataset.
4) JSRT: The JSRT was described in Section II-B. Our
JSRT results were produced with networks similar to the
ResNet-44 networks for CIFAR-10 from Section III-I1, using
filters of size 64, 96, and 128, and with an initial convolution
of kernel size 9 followed by an average pooling layer of size
8. Additionally, each input image was normalized such that it
had zero-mean and unit variance; this was done due to wild
variations in the different scans and scanned regions. Regions
of 256 × 256 pixels were selected either A) with the central
point being part of the nodule annotation for images containing
nodules, or B) entirely randomly for images not containing
nodules. Malignant and benign classifications were considered
the same, under a new “nodule” category (making the problem
binary). Training images were heavily augmented with shear
angles from [−30, 30] degrees, rotated from [−45, 45] degrees,
and scaled on a factor of [0.61, 1.65]. Additionally, random
square regions of the final training image between [0, 64] pixels
on each side were set to either black or white, to augment
against the earlier per-image normalization.
J. Code Availability
A reference implementation of the techniques pre-
sented throughout this section applied to the CIFAR-
10 dataset may be found at https://github.com/wwoods/
adversarial-explanations-cifar.
IV. RESULTS
The majority of our experiments were conducted on CIFAR-
10 due to it being a smaller dataset which was faster for
iterating parameters and ideas. The utility of explanations
produced via AE is explored on CIFAR-10 in Section IV-A.
CIFAR-10 experiments detailing ablations of the methods from
Section III are explored in detail in Section IV-B. Experiments
on ILSVRC 2012 were also conducted, and are covered in
Section IV-D. Experiments on the COCO dataset are covered
in Section IV-E.
A. CIFAR-10 Adversarial Explanations
A comparison of the Grad-CAM method of explaining an
NN and our AEs is shown in Fig. 13. This figure was produced
using our CIFAR-10 network with the highest attack ARA. The
left half of (a) demonstrates four different input images, and the
corresponding NN predictions for the most confident class and
either the second-most-confident class, or the true class, if it
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Fig. 13: Exploring the explanatory power of AEs. The top four rows, subfigure (a), are in the same format as Fig. 1. Below that, (b) through (i) are annotated
versions of the AEs for subfigure (a), indicating regions which contributed to or detracted from each predicted class. See Section IV-A for full commentary.
was not the most confident prediction. Next to the input image
are “Grad-CAM1” and “Grad-CAM2,” containing the Grad-
CAM explanations for the two displayed class predictions.
We note that even for very disparate classes, such as “cat”
and “truck” in the first row, the Grad-CAM explanations are
mostly the same, and do little to indicate the textures or
shapes which influenced the decision. Following the Grad-
CAM explanations, in the right half of (a), are two AEs,
representing gexplain+ for each of the two class predictions
displayed by the original input image. Each AE shows the
new top-two network predictions, an image of the differences
between the original input and the adversarial image, and the
adversarial image itself. Below (a) are subfigures (b) through
(i), which detail each of the AEs.
Subfigures (b) and (c) demonstrate relevant conclusions
which may be drawn from the AEs in row 1 of (a). The
network correctly classified this image as “cat,” but from
the difference image in (b), it can be seen that the “cat”
class confidence would have been even higher with a blacker
body and without the cat’s face. The body was annotated as
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a positive contribution because, while the adversarial image
changed the body, it kept the overall structure of that region,
and increased its contrast. On the other hand, the cat’s face is
almost entirely removed from the adversarial image, indicating
it contributed against the “cat” classification. This indicates
that the NN did not possess the logic needed to recognize
a face in that configuration as belonging to a cat, perhaps
because the cat’s face is too small of a feature in the image. In
(c), the explanation for the “truck” prediction illustrates that the
framing of the central cat mimics the framing of many “truck”
photos in the training data. That is, the shapes of the corners of
the image were well preserved, with the high-contrast upper-
right corner being similar to the division between a trailer and
the sky. The truck which was added as part of the explanation
was missing in the original image, and was thus annotated as
a counter-indicator. Note though that the RMSE between the
original image and either of (b) or (c) is the same - while
the truck is a significant addition in terms of detail, the cat’s
body was preferentially much darker for a more confident “cat”
classification. Note also that the final class confidences for
these AEs are 0.31 and 0.57, indicating that in L2 space, the
input image is much closer to a large “truck” manifold than
a “cat” manifold. With AEs, we gain information about the
network’s function not only through the input features which
would be need to be modified, but also through the resulting
class confidences.
Subfigures (d) and (e) annotate the AEs from row 2 of
(a). Interestingly in (d), the adversarial explanation for “car”
relaxes the slope of the pillar against the windshield, and
removes much of the coloring around the wheel well. Neither
of those features would often be found in cars, though they
were present in the original input. With these modifications
in place, the shape of the vehicle’s front matches that of a
car, and it becomes unclear whether or not the trailer is in the
foreground. The “truck” AE, (e), indicates that the main reason
this input was not identified as a “truck” was the missing gap
between the tractor and the trailer. With that feature in place,
confidence in a “truck” class skyrocketed.
Subfigures (f) and (g) are the AEs corresponding to row
3 of (a). The reasoning behind the network’s final guess of
“frog” was hard to see at first, but two major factors clearly
contributed. First, in (f), the frog-skin shading already existed
on the right side of the face. While the AE exaggerated this
shading, it was clearly already present. Second, in (g), more
or less the entire image was turned more red and higher
contrast to inspire a “dog” prediction. Looking at the final
confidences, with a maximum of 0.27 even with significant
perturbations, this image was likely somewhat distant from the
original training data’s manifold, and possessed just enough of
the frog-skin shading on the face to convince the network of
the “frog” class being most applicable.
Subfigures (h) and (i) are the AEs corresponding to row 4
of (a). Here, in (h), the top half of the image was similar to a
bird face when rounded out a bit. The actual dog pixels in the
bottom half of the image were significantly smoothed in this
AE, indicating that they were counter-indicators of the “bird”
class. In (i), one key feature prevented a dog classification. If
the white piece of clothing in the original image’s middle-left
swept further down, then the center of the image would have
looked more dog-like, with the resulting black bubble forming
a nose. It is also clear that a bit more contrast within the dog’s
pixels would also have helped.
Altogether, AEs show significantly more information about
the NN’s operation than prior state-of-the-art techniques like
Grad-CAM. Full-color, textured explanations in the form of
AEs lend not only the ability to see which features are missing
for a given classification, but also the effect that adding those
features would have on the predicted class confidences. Unlike
previous approaches, AEs also take the NN’s non-linearities
into account.
B. CIFAR-10 Experiments
All CIFAR-10 experiments run with a ResNet-44 have been
plotted in Fig. 14. At each level of accuracy (x axis), there
may be several dots for ARA (y axis), indicating separate
experiments with different levels of adversarial resistance.
The variance of individual experiments is indicated in Sec-
tion IV-B3; generally, the standard deviation for any of final
classification accuracies was ±0.2 %, and the standard devia-
tion for ARA calculations was ±0.0001. The most immediate
quality to be seen comparing best-in-class RMSEs across
different accuracies is that accuracy may be sacrificed for
additional adversarial resistance.
Large, colored dots indicate selected experiments. • N1
indicates a traditional ResNet-44, not modified for increased
resistance. • N2 indicates a traditional ResNet-44 trained with
adversarial training alone. • N3 indicates a ResNet-44 with
the modifications from Section III, and was trained with both
adversarial training and Ltarget = 1.5. • N4 indicates a similar
ResNet-44 to N3, but without the adversarial training. A com-
parison of adversarial attacks against the networks indicated by
colored dots may be found in Fig. 15. The adversarial attacks
against even the most robust of the networks were still very
small perturbations, but did result in the visible accentuation
of certain features, particularly the car door. An ideal network
would produce genuine ambiguity at the adversarial example
boundary. However, the right side of this figure demonstrates
the proposed explanation techniques applied to the different
networks. Each of the gexplain columns were produced with an
RMSE of 0.15; N1’s explanations look like static, indicative of
that network’s spurious decision-making boundaries. While the
example for the adversarially trained N2 is beginning to exhibit
salient features, there is little difference between the “car”
and “cat” columns. In contrast, N3 and N4 both demonstrate
clear features, illustrating the utility of our stochastic Lipschitz
regularization and other techniques for producing networks
capable of generating coherent explanations.
See Appendix B for more examples of adversarial explana-
tions with our CIFAR-10 networks. We emphasize that adver-
sarial attacks against networks using our regularization term
demonstrated increasingly salient features from the targeted
class as the BTR ARA metric increased. These salient features
were not forced from any term which necessitated a recon-
struction of the input, as one would see with a GAN or VAE,
indicating that the proposed technique alone was sufficient for
producing classifiers which rely on salient features.
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Fig. 14: Plot of all CIFAR-10 experiments run with a ResNet-44; accuracy
on clean data versus attack ARA (as per Section III-A). • N1 indicates an
unmodified ResNet-44,• N2 indicates a network trained with only adversarial
training, • N3 indicates a network which combines adversarial training
and our regularization, and • N4 indicates an experiment using only our
regularization. Dotted experiments are also used in Fig. 15.
We note again that classifiers with a high clean accuracy and
low attack ARA are more fragile classifiers. The generalization
difference between the • N2 and • N3 networks may look
significant, with accuracy falling from 87.4 % to 68.4 %, but
the ARA rose from 0.0107 to 0.0197. The • N2 network loses
all predictive power against an adversary with a maximum
attack RMSE of 0.03, while the • N3 network retains its
predictive power out to an RMSE of 0.07, and the • N3
network becomes the more accurate of the two at an RMSE
of 0.01. An RMSE of 0.01 on CIFAR-10 is a virtually
imperceptible change; see Fig. S4 for an example of different
perturbation magnitudes. Section IV-A was produced using the• N3 network.
The most important CIFAR-10 experiments are detailed in
Tables I and II. Table I addresses ablations of the techniques
mentioned in Sections III-B to III-E, showing that these
techniques all work together to provide a reasonable level
of adversarial resistance. Table II illustrates the merits of
Sections III-F to III-H. The following sections share the same
titles as the table entries for easy cross-referencing. Where
applicable, rows in the tables have the same colored dots as
Fig. 14, indicating the exact experiments conducted for those
results.
1) Traditional ResNet-44: Our baseline ResNet-44 result
is denoted in the first row of both Tables I and II. The •
dot in the row means that it corresponds to the experiment
with the same dot in Figs. 14 and 15. For this model, none of
the adversarial explanations are sensible to a human observer,
yet result in a significant change in the network’s output (see
Appendix B for more examples).
2) Varied ψ from Eq. (9): We sought to verify that increas-
ing the strength of our proposed regularization would lead to
an increase in adversarial resistance. The first section of Table I
demonstrated that this was the case, with the classifier’s attack
and BTR ARAs increasing monotonically with the strength of
the regularization. Notable also is that, up to a certain level
car 0.91
Original
truck 0.42
gadv
truck 0.78
gbtr
car 1.00
gexplain+
cat 1.00
gexplain−
car 0.94 truck 0.46 truck 0.85 car 1.00 cat 1.00
car 0.55 truck 0.37 horse 0.17 car 0.83 cat 0.37
car 0.44 truck 0.30 horse 0.18 car 0.77 dog 0.28
Fig. 15: Input (left) and adversarial examples of different CIFAR-10 classes,
generated for NNs with different levels of adversarial resistance using the
different g(·) functions from Section III-A, as indicated by the heading at
the top of each column. The relative accuracy and attack RMSEs may be
compared in Fig. 14; from top to bottom, these correspond to the experiments
denoted by • N1, • N2, • N3, and • N4 dots. gexplain− was generated
by emphasizing the “cat” category.
of ψ = 4.0, we were able to maintain the classifier’s accuracy
on clean data while gaining additional adversarial resistance.
After that, clean accuracy decreased as adversarial resistance
increased. Therefore, ψ may be varied in accordance with
which is more desirable: accuracy or adversarial resistance.
We also note that the training accuracy never reached 100 %
for these experiments, indicating that a ResNet-44 does not
have the ability to express a solution to the classification
problem which both optimizes accuracy and has derivatives
approximately equal to zero; this is explored further in Sec-
tion IV-B5.
3) Varying K from Eq. (9): The stochastic formulation
of Eq. (9) was expected to yield the same results as a non-
stochastic formulation. To check the validity of this assump-
tion, we tried different values of K, from 1 to 8. These
experiments demonstrated that varying K had little effect. As
such, all subsequent experiments used K = 1, which is more
efficient to compute than any greater K as it only requires one
additional backpropagation per training batch.
These experiments were virtually identical, with accuracy
having a standard deviation of ±0.2 %, and ARA metrics hav-
ing a standard deviation of ±0.0001. Thus, they demonstrated
that training with the proposed regularization produced results
with little variance.
4) Regularization methods: From the prior groups of ex-
periments, it may be concluded that the adversarial resistance
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TABLE I: Effect of Modifications on CIFAR-10
Description Acc. Attack ARA BTR ARA
• Traditional ResNet-44 92.2 0.0013 0.0014
Varying ψ from Eq. (9)
ψ = 0.55, K = 1 92.5 0.0022 0.0026
ψ = 4.0 92.4 0.0039 0.0048
ψ = 30. 90.2 0.0059 0.0080
ψ = 220 84.5 0.0083 0.0135
Varying K from Eq. (9)
L2,adv, ψ = 220, K = 1 84.5 0.0083 0.0135
K = 2 85.0 0.0084 0.0134
K = 4 85.0 0.0084 0.0135
K = 8 84.8 0.0082 0.0133
Regularization methods
No additional regularization, ψ = 30 90.2 0.0059 0.0080
Stochastic depth [50], pL = 0.8 89.6 0.0059 0.0073
Stochastic depth, pL = 0.5 86.8 0.0051 0.0060
ShakeDrop [51], α = 0, pL = 0.8 83.4 0.0043 0.0063
Varied network depth/width
ψ = 12, 000 56.5 0.0110 0.0347
ResNet-170 55.2 0.0104 0.0332
ResNet-44, double width 59.3 0.0118 0.0343
“Dead zone” from Section III-B
ψ = 12, 000, σ = 0 56.5 0.0110 0.0347
σ = 0.01 66.8 0.0112 0.0288
σ = 0.05 79.4 0.0107 0.0197
σ = 0, ψ = 220 for similar accuracy 77.1 0.0102 0.0194
Half-Huber ReLU from Section III-D
ψ = 12, 000, normal ReLU 56.5 0.0110 0.0347
ψ = 12, 000, HHReLU 78.0 0.0125 0.0261
No HHReLU, but ψ = 220 for similar
accuracy
77.1 0.0102 0.0194
Varied ζ from Section III-B
ψ = 12, 000, HHReLU, ζ = 0 78.0 0.0125 0.0261
ζ = 0.2 73.4 0.0128 0.0297
ζ = 0.5 74.1 0.0118 0.0254
ζ = 0.8 74.7 0.0107 0.0216
ζ = 0.99 72.3 0.0083 0.0191
Output zeroing from Section III-E
Dead zone σ = 1e− 2, ζ = 0,
kout = 0, HHReLU, layer drop 0.8
78.5 0.0123 0.0236
Same, kout = 0.01 78.9 0.0121 0.0222
Double epochs (400 total) 80.8 0.0118 0.0214
Weight regularization from Section III-C
Normal L2 weight regularization,
HHReLU, ζ = 0.2, dead zone
σ = 0.01
78.9 0.0131 0.0248
Bias-only 77.7 0.0126 0.0239
Effects of different modifications from Section III on the overall classification
accuracy and adversarial resistance of an NN classifying CIFAR-10 images.
“Acc.” is the accuracy on CIFAR-10’s test data after the final epoch. “Attack
ARA” and “BTR ARA” are both as described in Section III-A.
loss proposed in Eq. (9) provided a useful form of regular-
ization. We wanted to test the combination of using Eq. (9)
with other regularization techniques. Due to their promising
results on CIFAR-10, we investigated Stochastic Depth [50]
and ShakeDrop [51]. Our experiments with these showed that
the proposed regularization performed best on its own, with
additional regularizations resulting in lower accuracy on the
clean data as well as when dealing with an adversary. We note
that, as our networks’ training accuracy on the final epoch were
never significantly higher than their validation accuracy, it is
likely that a network would need significantly higher capacity
before additional regularization would be useful.
5) Varied network depth/width: As mentioned in Sec-
tions IV-B2 and IV-B4, the training loss never approached zero
when using the proposed regularization. We assumed this was
due to a lack of model capacity. As such, we tried two different
variations of the traditional ResNet, each having roughly 4× as
many parameters as the original network. ResNet-170 is four
times as deep, and we also used a ResNet-44 with filters of
size [32, 64, 128] for each of the three residual blocks, rather
than the traditional [16, 32, 64]. Interestingly, the ResNet-170
did not appear to have an easier time optimizing the training
accuracy. The double width ResNet-44, however, improved
slightly in both accuracy and adversarial resistance. As will
be seen in Section IV-B12, we found that another trick was
required to fully utilize additional network capacity.
At this point, one can begin to see the difference between
attack ARA and BTR ARA. Though the ψ = 12, 000 used for
these experiments resulted in a minor increase in attack ARA
from 0.0084 for ψ = 220 up to 0.0110, the accuracy fell
from 84.5 % down to 56.5 %. The BTR ARA jumped from
0.0135 to 0.0347. This indicates that while the ψ = 12, 000
classifier was worse at accurately identifying an object in a tiny
image, it retained predictive power against adversaries twice
as aggressive, and was much better at recognizing features of
objects within the dataset. This manifested as clearer images -
many of the adversarial perturbations for ψ = 220 still looked
like randomized noise, whereas the adversarial perturbations
for ψ = 12, 000 looked like deliberate changes to the objects
in the image.
6) “Dead zone” from Section III-B: A true Lipschitz-
enforcing loss would not require any penalty on derivatives
inside a region [−σ, σ]. These experiments demonstrated that
increasing σ results in higher accuracy but less adversarial
resistance, particularly in the BTR category. An additional
experiment which used σ = 0 but set ψ such that the final
accuracy is about the same demonstrates that there seemed
to be no benefit from the addition of this metaparameter, and
that leaving it at σ = 0 would seem to be the best choice. Part
of this was due to the difficulty of setting σ: different values
of ψ caused |∂ynk/∂xj | to be at different scales, and it was
difficult to decide on a good value of σ. As we will argue
in Section IV-B13, there is a better way to implement a true
Lipschitz constraint in Eq. (9), should it be beneficial.
7) Half-Huber ReLU from Section III-D: The experi-
ments before this point have used a traditional ReLU; here we
used the HHReLU instead, which has a continuous derivative.
At first glance the HHReLU was a modest improvement: im-
proved accuracy and attack ARA, but substantially decreased
BTR ARA. However, by training a ReLU network with an
adjusted ψ such that the accuracy was about the same as the
HHReLU version of the network, we saw that the HHReLU
version of the network was better in both attack and BTR
ARAs. Thus, the HHReLU is an important part of our regu-
larization method, helping networks to learn better structural
properties while retaining raw classification accuracy.
We note another potential explanation for a smaller BTR
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ARA in the first experiment with HHReLU: the HHReLU
makes gradients that are easier to follow, and consequently
also eases the task of generating successful attacks. That is,
the BTR ARA metric for the ReLU network may be inflated as
our adversary was unable to find low-perturbation attacks due
to the increased difficulty of following gradients in a ReLU
network.
8) Varied ζ from Section III-B: These results demon-
strated that ζ > 0 was capable of inducing better results on the
ARA metrics, but at a cost of some accuracy. We will revisit
ζ in Section IV-B14.
9) Output zeroing from Section III-E: This segment of
experiments contained two interesting outcomes. The first was
that biasing the pre-softmax part of the network toward zero
via kout = 0.01 slightly improved accuracy and slightly wors-
ened adversarial resistance. The second was that doubling the
number of epochs improved accuracy but worsened adversarial
resistance. This was likely due to adversarial overfitting: the
E[|∂ynk/∂xj |2] of the training data was lower for the double
epoch version, but the same quantity for the testing data
was higher. This also made sense with respect to improved
accuracy: as the loss from Eq. (9) approached zero, more
training bandwidth would be freed up for the classification
loss.
Interestingly, when considering an adaptive ψ value, we
found that this parameter produced a more pronounced effect:
see Section IV-B16.
10) Weight regularization from Section III-C: In Sec-
tion III-C we proposed that Eq. (9) might be a replacement
for the L2-loss traditionally imposed on weights as part of
the NN training process. This experiment demonstrated worse
performance without traditional L2 regularization, indicating
that architectures deeper than a single layer benefit from
both regularization terms. However, in Section IV-D1, we
elaborate on the need for less L2-regularization when using
our technique with large networks.
11) Adaptive ψ from Section III-F: All previous experi-
ments were executed with fixed values of ψ. Unfortunately,
ψ is a somewhat obtuse parameter, as shown by most of the
experiments thus far: it trades between accuracy and ARA in
a consistent, but difficult to control manner. Furthermore, as
shown by the double-epochs experiment from Section IV-B9,
fixing its value might be responsible for a type of overfitting.
This group of experiments tested whether targeting a specific
training loss – a known quantity with a more consistent mean-
ing than a specific ψ value – resulted in any beneficial behavior.
We first took an experiment with known good parameters at a
fixed ψ, and noted its classification loss on training data for the
final epoch: L = 1.007. Setting Ltarget from Eq. (15) to this
value, the proposed regularization with adaptive ψ resulted in
a sizeable accuracy bump, from 78 % to 81 %, while retaining
the same adversarial resistance. Using the same final ψ with
a fixed network resulted in similar adversarial resistance, but
lower accuracy.
TABLE II: Effect of Adaptiveness on CIFAR-10
Description Acc. Attack ARA BTR ARA
• Traditional ResNet-44 92.2 0.0013 0.0014
Others have HHReLU, normal weight regularization, no dead zone, K = 1,
ζ = 0, kout = 0.01, and use Ladv,z=2 unless otherwise specified.
Adaptive ψ from Section III-F
Fixed ψ = 12, 000, final training
classification loss 1.007
78.0 0.0125 0.0261
Ltarget = 1.007, initial ψ = 0.01,
final ψ = 14, 000
81.0 0.0124 0.0263
Fixed ψ = 14, 000 77.8 0.0131 0.0277
Varied network depth/width
Fixed ψ = 14, 000
ResNet-44 77.8 0.0131 0.0277
ResNet-170 79.9 0.0132 0.0267
ResNet-44, double width 81.9 0.0129 0.0257
Adaptive ψ, Ltarget = 1.007
ResNet-44 81.0 0.0124 0.0263
ResNet-44,
kψ,0 = 220, worse = 0.01
80.1 0.0127 0.0274
ResNet-170 82.1 0.0128 0.0277
ResNet-44, double width 82.5 0.0129 0.0286
Different Ladv from Section III-B with Ltarget = 1.007
Ladv,z=1 = Ladv,z=0,q=1 81.2 0.0069 0.0104
Ladv,z=2 81.0 0.0124 0.0263
Ladv,z=3 78.4 0.0139 0.0317
Ladv,z=4 77.9 0.0143 0.0326
Ladv,z=5 76.6 0.0144 0.0325
Ladv,z=0,q=2 81.1 0.0082 0.0176
Ladv,z=1,q=1 80.8 0.0080 0.0172
Ladv,z=2,q=1 79.9 0.0132 0.0295
Ladv,z=2,q=2 79.7 0.0132 0.0303
Ladv,tandem from Section III-B with Ltarget = 1.007
ResNet-44, ζ = 0 81.0 0.0124 0.0263
ResNet-44, ζ = 0.2 78.7 0.0127 0.0277
ResNet-44, ζ = 0.2, Ladv,tandem 80.2 0.0131 0.0302
ResNet-44, ζ = 0.2, Ladv,tandem
with sum
80.7 0.0121 0.0247
• ResNet-44, ζ = 0.2, Ladv,tandem,
Ltarget = 1.5
68.7 0.0151 0.0423
Adversarial / noisy training from Section III-G
Madry et al. method, using L2 adversarial training• L2,  = 0.01 87.4 0.0107 0.0153
L2,  = 0.1 88.6 0.0077 0.0205
Madry et al. method, but with L2,min training
L2,min,  = 0.01 88.1 0.0092 0.0111
L2,min,  = 0.1 73.8 0.0121 0.0199
HHAT, L2,min,  = 0.1 84.4 0.0126 0.0179
HHAT, L2,min,  = 0.1, no HHReLU 84.3 0.0122 0.0180
L2,min,  = 0.25 74.6 0.0151 0.0256
HHAT, L2,min,  = 0.25 83.1 0.0132 0.0204
Equation (9) with adv. training, using Ltarget = 1.5 and Ladv,tandem
L2,min,  = 0.1 69.7 0.0195 0.0390• HHAT, L2,min,  = 0.1 68.4 0.0197 0.0450
HHAT, L2,  = 0.1 66.6 0.0164 0.0444
HHAT, L2,min,  = 0.01 67.5 0.0163 0.0443
HHAT, L2,min,  = 0.1,
Ltarget = 1.007
79.0 0.0163 0.0306
Gaussian noise, using Ltarget = 1.0 and Ladv,tandem
Gaussian +- 0.05 78.9 0.0135 0.0309
Gaussian +- 0.25 72.8 0.0129 0.0301
Combined adversarial training with output zeroing from Section III-E• HHAT with output zeroing 68.4 0.0197 0.0450
HHAT without output zeroing 65.8 0.0197 0.0465
Active Learning from Section III-H
ResNet-44, double width,
Ltarget = 1.007
82.5 0.0129 0.0286
Active learning version, 448/730
annotations
82.7 0.0128 0.0285
Active learning version, 1,331/2,731
annotations
82.6 0.0133 0.0296
Effects of adaptive ψ from Section III-F on network accuracy and adversarial
resistance. Columns are the same as Table I.
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12) Varied network depth/width: Revisiting the varied net-
work sizes of Section IV-B5, but using HHReLU, we compared
fixed and adaptive ψ formulations. Unlike Section IV-B5, the
fixed ψ versions of these larger networks did demonstrate
significant improvements to accuracy compared to the baseline
ResNet-44, potentially due to HHReLU having increased the
quality of the gradients when also contending with the adver-
sarial loss of Eq. (9). However, adversarial resistance declined.
For the original ResNet-44 architecture, an adaptive setting
of ψ was moderately better for accuracy and worse for
ARA metrics. Recall that this group of experiments used
kψ,0 = 0.01, worse = 1 from Section III-F, indicating
a very small ψ initially. We suspected that the change in
performance may have been due to the “shock” of suddenly
adding a new regularization term, and that starting with a larger
kψ,0 might alleviate the problem. To test this, we added an
additional experiment with kψ,0 = 220 and worse = 0.01
from Section III-F. This experiment retained much of the
accuracy benefit of using an adaptive ψ, while recovering much
of the lost adversarial robustness.
For deeper or wider networks, the adaptive ψ versions
demonstrated improvements in both accuracy and adversarial
ARA over the similar kψ,0 = 0.01 experiment with a basic
ResNet-44. We theorize that over-penalizing gradients early
in network training stymies growth, whereas gradually adding
the gradient penalty allows the network to first establish
knowledge and subsequently refine it, allowing better usage of
additional parameters. Under this adaptive scheme, the double
width network outperformed the quadruple depth network by
a narrow margin.
13) Different Ladv from Section III-B with Ltarget =
1.007: All previously mentioned experiments were conducted
using Ladv,z=2 from Eq. (9). Though the original theory in
Section III-B indicated z = 1 would be logical based on the
behavior of derivatives in a linear network, actual networks are
non-linear. In prior NN regularization work, the L2 method of
weight regularization has consistently been more effective in
terms of final accuracy.
This segment of experiments reinforced that z = 1 per-
formed unambiguously worse than z = 2. Interestingly, larger
values of z led to increasing amounts of adversarial resistance,
at a cost of accuracy. Note that due to Ltarget, all of the
different z experiments had similar final training losses, and
their testing losses were also all about the same, with a mean
and standard deviation of 1.03 ± 0.02. Therefore, the decline
in accuracy probably came from increased bias due to the
interrelation of the proposed regularization method and the
bias/variance trade-off.
We note that large values of z with an adaptive ψ approaches
a true Lipschitz constraint at its limit, with a variable constraint
on the derivative given by the interaction of ψ and z.
We also note that the improved attack ARA performance
of z > 2 appears to have been unique to CIFAR-10; see
Section IV-D. However, BTR ARA increases were consistent
on the ILSVRC task as well (Section IV-D).
Experiments with q from Section III-B were also conducted,
and showed similar trade-offs, replacing accuracy with in-
creased ARA. We leave further exploration of this hyperpa-
rameter space to future work.
14)Ladv,tandem from Section III-B: The first two exper-
iments in this section reprised the results from Section IV-B8,
though with an adaptive ψ. The third experiment demonstrated
that much of the accuracy loss from ζ > 0 could be recovered
by smoothing the difference between the true label and the
next-most-confident label (as opposed to smoothing the true
label alone). Furthermore, this technique resulted in higher
attack and BTR ARA metrics.
The fourth experiment demonstrates what happened when
Ladv,tandem was changed to use addition instead of subtrac-
tion. Accuracy improved further, but attack and BTR ARAs
dropped significantly. We have no explanation for that partic-
ular phenomenon at this time.
The fifth experiment, with Ltarget = 1.5, was ran for
parity with experiments in Paragraph IV-B15c. While accuracy
slinked down from 80.2 % to 68.7 %, both ARAs increased.
The BTR ARA increased most significantly, from 0.0302 to
0.0423. We note that this is the highest BTR ARA of any
of the experiments mentioned thus far, demonstrating that the
proposed regularization continues to scale and provide benefits
even into substantially decreased levels of accuracy.
15) Adversarial / noisy training from Section III-G: This
group of results is divided into four sub-groups: reproducing
Madry et al.’s results, using Madry et al.’s technique with the
L2,min adversary, combining our regularization with adversar-
ial training, and combining our regularization with Gaussian
noise.
a) Madry et al. method, using L2 adversarial training:
These experiments used adversarial training as a standalone
technique to provide resistance to adversarial examples. They
were modeled off of the prior work of Madry et al. [13]
and from personal communication with A. Madry. The •
dot indicates the N2 experiment labeled in Figs. 14 and 15,
and was a reproduction of the best results from personal
communication with A. Madry, albeit with a ResNet-44 instead
of a ResNet-50. This experiment was therefore used for our
comparison with the state of the art.
We note that increasing  from the recommended value of
0.01 for CIFAR-10 had little beneficial effect: accuracy sur-
prisingly increased, but only from 87.4 % to 88.6 %, and attack
ARA decreased from 0.0107 to 0.0077. Interestingly, BTR
ARA did increase, from 0.0153 to 0.0205. We hypothesize this
was due to BTR ARA measuring the classifier’s ability to rec-
ognize features of object classes, without penalizing for related
classes. Since the adversarial perturbations were substantially
larger, more trucks could be made to look like automobiles, for
instance, and the differences between these classes broke down
even though the classifier improved at distinguishing them
from the other classes such as bird, dog, etc. This phenomenon
was discussed previously in Section III-B.
b) Madry et al. method, but with L2,min training: We
next tested our proposed L2,min method of adversarial training,
described in Section III-G. The baseline measurements at  =
0.01 were comparable though slightly worse than those for
L2 adversarial training. The measurements at a higher  = 0.1
showed drastically decreased accuracy, but significantly higher
attack ARA and comparable BTR ARA to the L2 training with
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Fig. 16: The L2,min method of adversarial generation adds stability to
adversarial training, but can suffer from degeneracy, where multiple training
examples of the same class override a lone neighbor of a different class. Here,
L2,min adversarial training would result in “Class A” being overshadowed
by the two “Class B” instances. Since L2,min stops at the border of a
misclassification, the class with fewer local members only successfully trains a
very narrow region. As per Paragraph IV-B15b, this may be fixed with HHAT.
the same . The decreased accuracy was likely due to L2,min
causing a sort of degeneracy, explained in Fig. 16. Regardless,
when combined with Half-Half adversarial training, denoted as
“HHAT” in the results, L2,min training recovered much of its
lost accuracy while retaining the attack ARA and BTR ARA
benefits.
In keeping with the other experiments of Table II, many
of the adversarial training experiments were conducted with
HHReLU rather than ReLU. This was unlikely to affect the
results, as HHReLU is very close to ReLU for approaches
that minimize only loss and not its derivatives. One additional
experiment was run to ensure that this did not make a differ-
ence. As predicted, accuracy and ARA statistics are virtually
identical for adversarial training with and without HHReLU.
To further test the progression of L2,min into larger values of
, we conducted two further experiments with  = 0.25. These
showed a surprising increase in accuracy for the non-HHAT
version, and predictably increased ARA ratings. The HHAT
version followed the expected course of decreased accuracy
and increased robustness.
One aspect we wish to point out is that the best-case attack
ARA from these experiments, which used only adversarial
training, is on-par or slightly better than the best-case attack
ARA using only our proposed regularization, when compared
at the same level of accuracy on clean data. However, the BTR
ARA was lower for any of the adversarial training experiments
when compared to the BTR ARAs for our regularization. We
therefore posit that adversarial training helps to stabilize the
direction of steepest ascent for the loss function, while our
proposed regularization stabilizes the entire loss surface. The
definitions of the two techniques provide this distinction, and
the empirical evidence appears to support it.
c) Equation (9) with adv. training, using Ltarget = 1.5
and Ladv,tandem: Combining what was learned from the previ-
ous sections, experiments were conducted with a combination
of adversarial training and our proposed regularization. These
yielded the best results, improving over the previous bests in
both attack ARA and BTR ARA for given levels of accuracy.
The HHAT variety of adversarial training best preserved the
benefits to BTR ARA, so that is what we recommend moving
forward. We also note the importance of both L2,min adver-
sarial training and an appropriately high value of  for attack
ARA. While smaller values of  still yielded excellent BTR
ARA, this was also seen in Section IV-B14, and as such likely
came almost entirely from our method.
d) Gaussian noise, using Ltarget = 1.0 and Ladv,tandem:
The combination of our method with adversarial training was
motivated by an attempt to find “loss cliffs” (Section III-G). To
ensure that the computational overhead of adversarial training
added value to this cause beyond that of random noise, we
also ran several experiments with Gaussian noise added on a
per-component basis. In these experiments, each color value
of each pixel received a perturbation independent of all other
colors on all other pixels. Again, the BTR ARA was mostly
preserved, but the attack ARA was substantially lower than
when combined with adversarial training.
16) Combined adversarial training with output zeroing
from Section III-E: These two experiments demonstrated
that the output zeroing method can have a more significant
impact on accuracy without affecting attack ARA when us-
ing an adaptive ψ, but that the overall benefit was likely
not worthwhile, particularly when considering the additional
metaparameter. Nonetheless, most of the experiments in this
paper were conducted with output zeroing as in Section III-E.
C. Active Learning from Section III-H
Two datasets were investigated for active learning: CIFAR-
10 and the JSRT dataset.
In CIFAR-10, two annotators annotated overly-saturated
adversarial images generated from a double-width ResNet-
44 via the UI in Fig. 12. These adversarial images were
produced from the CIFAR-10 training data. One annotator
annotated 730 and the other annotated 2,107 images. Of these
annotations, 106 were of the same images, and 72 of those
were annotated with the same decision (changed, unchanged,
or unsure), indicating that annotators agreed on 68 % of the
images. The double-width ResNet-44 architecture was then re-
trained from scratch using a dataset consisting of the original
CIFAR-10 training data concatenated with the adversarial
images annotated “unchanged.” The first experiment only used
annotations from the first annotator, and had a total of 448
adversarial images with an “unchanged” target class added
to the training dataset; the second experiment had a total of
1,331 images added. Example adversarial examples annotated
as “changed” and “unchanged” may be found in Appendix C.
In the first experiment, adding a small number of annotations
made virtually no difference. Note that CIFAR-10 has 50,000
training images, so we only increased the dataset’s size by
0.9 %. In the second experiment, which added 2.7 %, we saw
an approximately 3 % gain in both attack ARA and BTR ARA,
with little change in accuracy. These gains could potentially be
improved by stacking adversarial training with the technique.
A comparison of the adversarial examples from these networks
may be found in Appendix C. Given that the examples added to
the dataset came from the dataset itself, a linear improvement
in attack defense was very promising. This indicated that a
smaller dataset might find more benefit from adding training
examples in this manner.
The JSRT dataset consists of only 247 images, of which
199 were used for training. An annotator annotated 150 of
the training images using the UI from Fig. 12, 46 of which
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were marked “unchanged,” meaning that the training dataset
was increased by 23 %. A baseline JSRT classification net-
work with no additional training data had an attack ARA of
0.00057 on the remaining 48 testing images, and a modified
network trained with the additional annotations had an attack
ARA of 0.00095, an increase of 1.7×. To check that this
was not a function of a larger training set, we trained an
additional network using random annotations, selecting 46 of
the 150 annotations without regard for the annotation. The
network trained with random annotations had an attack ARA
of 0.00049, or 0.9× the original network’s ARA. Annotations
were therefore very important for improving the network,
validating the need for an active learning pipeline. We note
that the 1.7× increase in ARA might be somewhat inflated
from calculation noise, as the JSRT ARAs were evaluated on
only 48 testing images. Nonetheless, contrasting the value of
active and random annotations, there was a clear, beneficial
effect, which future work might further elucidate.
On datasets with few samples, an active learning pipeline
might be a very valuable way to expand training data, assuming
the availability of reliable human annotations.
D. ImageNet Experiments
Our results on CIFAR-10 were encouraging, but not a
guarantee that the technique would extend to larger networks
with more complicated tasks. We trained several networks on
ILSVRC 2012, but were somewhat limited in experiments due
to each taking roughly a week to train on our hardware without
adversarial training, and several weeks with adversarial train-
ing. Nonetheless, we validated our ResNet-18 implementation
with a top-1 accuracy of 65.6 %, consistent with literature
given we used 65 epochs rather than the usual 90. Results
for the following sections are found in Table III.
1) Weight regularization from Section III-C: While using
the proposed regularization to replace L2 weight regularization
as per Section III-C did not pan out for CIFAR-10, in ImageNet
we found that it was vital to reduce the amount of L2 weight
regularization from 1e − 4 to 1e − 6 for the network to
converge with our regularization. This was not required for the
standard ResNet-18. Relative to the task, ResNet-18 is likely
underparameterized, and the classification loss, L2 loss, and
proposed Ladv loss were likely too at odds to find a good
solution. Reducing the amount of L2 loss made the problem
tractable again.
2) Automatic ψ from Section III-F: Given its efficacy
on CIFAR-10, and that it was a better parameterization of
the problem, we conducted all but one of the ILSVRC 2012
experiments with an adaptive ψ. All of these were conducted
with HHReLU, an L2 weight regularization of 1e-6, no dead
zone, σ = 0, kout = 5e − 5, and Ladv,z=2 unless otherwise
specified. The first two experiments in this group showed
that, again, an adaptive ψ outperformed a fixed value of ψ.
The subsequent experiments demonstrated the existence of
the accuracy/attack RMSE trade-off, just like with CIFAR-10.
However, with 1,000 classes, ImageNet’s attack ARA did not
scale well as accuracy fell. The BTR ARA scaled well. See
Appendix E for examples of adversarial examples generated
on these networks.
TABLE III: Effect of Modifications on ImageNet and COCO
Description Acc. Attack ARA BTR ARA
Standard ResNet-18 65.6 0.0004 0.0013
Weight regularization from Section III-C
ψ = 0.7e6, dead zone 0.002,
kout = 5e− 5†
20.6 0.0013 0.0125
Use 1e-6 instead of 1e-4 L2
regularization
50.4 0.0039 0.0184
Automatic ψ from Section III-F
ψ = 4.8e6 42.9 0.0041 0.0185
Ltarget = 3.1 45.5 0.0041 0.0182
Ltarget = 3.1 with HHAT,  = 0.1 42.2 0.0053 0.0282
Ltarget = 4.0, no HHAT 35.5 0.0041 0.0243
Ltarget = 5.0 23.7 0.0038 0.0388
Ltarget = 5.0, Ladv,z=2,q=1 22.0 0.0037 0.0538
Ltarget = 5.0, Ladv,z=5 19.7 0.0035 0.0526
COCO
ResNet-44 from Section III-I3, baseline 77.3 0.0003 0.0008
With Eq. (9) 45.2 0.0029 0.0278
AT only, L2,min,  = 0.1 60.8 0.0025 0.0089
Combined Eq. (9) + AT 45.2 0.0026 0.0228
Combined Eq. (9) + HHAT 45.2 0.0029 0.0250
Balanced classes, Eq. (9) only 25.8 0.0055 0.0335
Balanced classes, Eq. (9) + HHAT 26.9 0.0054 0.0325
Effects of different modifications from Section III on the overall classification
accuracy and adversarial resistance of an NN classifying ImageNet and COCO
images.
† This experiment was aborted after 18 epochs as it went unstable; the
experiment below it had an accuracy of 43.0 % at the same number of epochs.
The proposed regularization method worked well on
ILSVRC 2012, and was capable of generating convincing
adversarial examples for many of the target classes. Other
target classes, such as “n01484850 great white shark,” were
clearly underspecified in the dataset, probably due to a lack
of other classes with similar features. Many shark images are
predominantly water, a property shared by few other ILSVRC
2012 classes. Similarly, the adversarial explanations resulted in
the addition of water to the input more than any other feature.
When comparing this ARA with that of Cohen et al.’s [12],
we point out that our computational resources only allowed for
a ResNet-18 on the ImageNet challenge versus their ResNet-
50. The literature around this topic, and our own work when
dealing with an adaptive ψ, supports that larger networks tend
to demonstrate greater adversarial resistance [11], [12].
E. COCO Experiments
Experiments were conducted on COCO to determine the
efficacy of our regularization. As described in Section III-I3,
the COCO dataset was a somewhat unique experiment as many
of the images overlapped with other classes and the “person”
class was over-represented as 31.4 % of the total dataset.
Without any methods providing adversarial resistance, our
COCO network scored 77.3 % accuracy with an attack ARA
rating of 0.0003. Note that the high accuracy of a naive
classifier – 31.4 % – swallows up much of the area that
would otherwise increase the ARA ratings on this problem.
Adversarial training added a good amount of attack ARA but
only a little BTR ARA, consistent with previous experiments
22
from Paragraph IV-B15b. However, using only our technique
without any adversarial training resulted in the best overall
statistics. We initially supposed this was due to the class
imbalance, as L2,min adversarial training can suppress the cor-
rect label (Fig. 16). Unfortunately, experiments with balanced
training on the COCO dataset, such that the classification loss
for each label was divided by the percentage of that label, still
resulted in little benefit from adversarial training. It is thus
very possible that adversarial training did not make the COCO
networks more robust as a consequence of the high number of
overlapping objects in different frames — the actual distances
between classes in the base problem were sufficiently small
that adversarial training offered little benefit.
V. CONCLUSION
We demonstrated a regularization technique based on the
Lipschitz constraint, which significantly enhanced the ability
of networks to resist adversarial examples. This was paired
with other innovations, including a Half-Huber Rectified Lin-
ear Unit and improved adversarial training methodology. On
ILSVRC 2012, the methods in this work increased the ARA
by 2.4× over the previous state of the art, while retaining the
same level of accuracy on clean data and using a network one-
third of the size of the previous state of the art. More central
to the tenets of this work, we demonstrated that the stability
added by these techniques allows for adversarial examples to
be generated with very discernible features. These adversar-
ial examples could then be used as non-linear explanation
mechanisms, termed adversarial explanations, working with
the network and its non-linearities to produce more reliable
explanations than prior work. Furthermore, we demonstrated
that AEs might be annotated and fed back into the training
process as part of an active learning pipeline to yield improved
adversarial resistance. We hope that this work provides a basis
for future work in the realms of both adversarial resistance
and explainable machine learning, making algorithms more
reliable for industry fields where accountability matters, such
as biomedical or autonomous vehicles.
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APPENDIX
A. CIFAR-10 Attack ARA Comparison
This appendix contains adversarial examples against
CIFAR-10 networks with differing attack ARAs. The networks
used were the same ones annotated in Fig. 14. N1 denotes a tra-
ditional NN, N2 denotes an NN with only adversarial training,
N3 denotes an NN with both our proposed regularization and
adversarial training, and N4 denotes an NN trained only with
our proposed regularization. The attack ARAs of N1 through
N4 were 0.0013, 0.0107, 0.0197, and 0.0151, respectively.
The adversarial examples shown in Figs. S1 and S2 were
the closest examples to the original images which resulted in
a misclassification, found across 450 steps of optimization,
as per Section III-A1. The “Attacked” column indicates a
misclassified image, the “Input” column indicates the original
input, and the “Noise” column indicates the difference between
the two. If the “Noise” column is entirely black, the RMSE
will be 0, indicating that the network was incorrect without
any adversarial perturbation.
The most extreme perturbations are found in Fig. S1a. In
the examples for N2, the adversarially trained network, the
changes are barely perceptible, while the N3 network required
significant changes for misclassifications to occur. However,
the adversarial examples which were not among the largest
perturbations, found in Fig. S2, are largely imperceptible for
all networks. We point this out to motivate future work in
increasing these margins, and to point out that while the 84 %
increase of attack ARA does set a new state of the art, the most
significant gains from our techniques came from illuminating
salient features through AEs.
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Fig. S1: See Appendix A for details.
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Fig. S2: See Appendix A for details.
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B. CIFAR-10
This appendix contains example adversarial images from
the CIFAR-10 dataset, using the same networks annotated in
Fig. 14. N1 denotes a traditional NN, N2 denotes an NN
with only adversarial training, N3 denotes an NN with both
our proposed regularization and adversarial training, and N4
denotes an NN trained only with our proposed regularization.
At the top of each column is a label for the target of gexplain+,
applied with ρ = 0.1.
As per Table II, the BTR ARAs of N1 through N4 were
0.0014, 0.0153, 0.0450, and 0.0423, respectively. N3 was
the best performer in the BTR ARA category. The below
Figs. S3, S5 and S6 support the ranking given by the BTR
ARA. For example, in Fig. S3a, consider which network
gave the most compelling explanation for each of the ten
categories; we propose N3, N3, N4, N2, N3, N3, N3, N3, N3,
and N4, respectively for each target column. By that count,
N3 produced that most compelling explanation 70 % of the
time. Further study of the relative explanatory benefit of these
techniques from the subjective view of human operators is
merited, but these results indicate that the BTR ARA is a
strong measure of explanation quality.
Figure S4 demonstrates results of applying gexplain+ with
varying levels of ρ; see the figure caption for more details.
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dog 0.50 plane 1.00 car 1.00 bird 1.00 cat 1.00 deer 1.00 dog 1.00 frog 1.00 horse 1.00 ship 0.99 truck 1.00
•N
3
cat 0.17 plane 0.46 car 0.71 bird 0.40 cat 0.40 deer 0.22 dog 0.45 frog 0.51 horse 0.61 ship 0.23 truck 0.65
•N
4
cat 0.15 plane 0.19 car 0.49 bird 0.25 cat 0.27 horse 0.21 cat 0.21 frog 0.31 horse 0.36 ship 0.16 truck 0.48
(a)
•N
1
dog 0.98
<input>
plane 1.00
plane
car 0.36
car
bird 0.36
bird
cat 1.00
cat
deer 1.00
deer
dog 1.00
dog
frog 1.00
frog
horse 0.47
horse
ship 1.00
ship
truck 1.00
truck
•N
2
cat 0.46 plane 1.00 car 1.00 bird 1.00 cat 1.00 deer 1.00 dog 1.00 frog 1.00 horse 1.00 ship 1.00 truck 1.00
•N
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frog 0.20 plane 0.18 car 0.68 bird 0.43 cat 0.40 deer 0.35 dog 0.34 frog 0.63 horse 0.34 ship 0.17 truck 0.60
•N
4
frog 0.17 cat 0.14 car 0.60 bird 0.24 cat 0.27 deer 0.27 dog 0.30 frog 0.38 horse 0.26 ship 0.14 truck 0.43
(b)
Fig. S3: See Appendix B for details.
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Fig. S4: While Fig. S3 demonstrates the relative performance of different visual explanations for various networks at a fixed noise magnitude ρ = 0.1, this
figure focuses on demonstrating the evolution of those explanations as ρ is varied between 0 and 0.2 (the numbers at the top of each column). The input figure
used was the same as Fig. S3b. For Fig. S4a, the target of gexplain+ is the “dog” class, and for Fig. S4b, the target is the “cat” class. The “cat” class was
chosen because it was one of the wrong predictions with a higher level of confidence, particularly for the N2 network. Note that the progression is non-linear,
with new features appearing at different levels of ρ.
Investigating Fig. S4a, one can see that the adversarially-trained N2 network relies on a small, dog-like feature around the nostrils of the original input image.
N3 and N4, the networks which additionally have the regularization of Eq. (9) (and the other tricks from Section III), rely more on the overall shading of the
face, and a larger dog-like feature which emerges by reshaping the left side of the input. From this, one might infer that the majority of CIFAR-10 training
images are of full dogs, and the network has adopted this bias.
In Fig. S4b, the progressions for the N3 and N4 networks make it clear that the shading on the left side of the face may be adapted into the form of a cat, a
likely reason for the misclassification. The N2 network exploits less of the source image to make this happen, but appears to suffer from a similar misconception.
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(c)
Fig. S5: See Appendix B for details.
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bird 0.55 plane 1.00 car 1.00 bird 1.00 cat 1.00 deer 1.00 dog 1.00 frog 1.00 horse 1.00 ship 1.00 truck 1.00
•N
3
deer 0.22 plane 0.72 car 0.62 bird 0.66 cat 0.20 deer 0.44 dog 0.37 frog 0.65 horse 0.56 ship 0.30 truck 0.36
•N
4
frog 0.19 plane 0.34 car 0.51 bird 0.34 cat 0.16 deer 0.33 dog 0.22 frog 0.41 horse 0.43 ship 0.22 truck 0.25
(c)
Fig. S6: See Appendix B for details.
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C. CIFAR-10 Active Learning
This appendix contains example adversarial images from
the CIFAR-10 dataset that were part of the active learning
experiments from Section IV-C. Appendix C1 contains exam-
ples from networks trained on the original CIFAR-10 data;
Appendix C2 contains comparison images between adversarial
examples from the original network and versions trained with
annotated data.
1) Sample Annotations: Figure S7 demonstrates annota-
tions from an annotator. Images are arranged in pairs; on the
left is the original image, and on the right is an adversarial
example constructed such that the difference between the
adversarial class and the true class is sadv − st = 0.5. The
original class is written below each image. Annotators were
asked whether or not the adversarial image still belonged to
the original class; see Fig. 12. The values from each annotator
are shown following the original label (as “yes” or “no” to
being the same class).
dog: no bird: yes bird: no bird: yes
bird: no bird: no dog: no dog: no
dog: yes cat: no cat: yes cat: no
truck: yes truck: yes truck: unsure truck: yes
car: no car: yes car: yes car: no
car: yes car: no car: yes truck: yes
Fig. S7: See Appendix C1 for details.
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2) Networks Trained with Active Learning Feedback:
Figure S8 contains groups of three rows: the version of the
network without active learning, from which annotations were
made, an active learning network trained with 448 additional
annotations, and an active learning network trained with 1,331
additional annotations. Just as the network with the most
annotations demonstrated a modest quantitative improvement
(Table II), inspection of these images demonstrates a more
fully formed idea of each class. The left-most image of each
group is the input, followed by adversarial examples formed
from gexplain+ targeting the classes of airplane, automobile,
bird, and cat.
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
(e) (f)
Fig. S8: See Appendix C2 for details.
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D. COCO
This appendix contains example adversarial images from the
COCO dataset. The networks used in these figures correspond
to networks from Table III: C1 is the row labeled “With
Eq. (9),” C2 is the row labeled “Combined Eq. (9) + HHAT,”
C3 is the row labeled “Balanced classes, Eq. (9) only,” and C4
is the row labeled “Balanced classes, Eq. (9) + HHAT.” The
BTR ARAs for C1 through C4 were 0.0278, 0.0250, 0.0335,
and 0.0325; note that C3 and C4’s BTR ARAs used a lower
naive baseline for the ARA calculation, as these datasets were
balanced. “<guess>” is used to indicate an explanation for
the highest-confidence prediction which was of the incorrect
class, and “<real>” is an explanation of the correct class. The
remaining columns show each network’s interpretation of the
image as the label at the top of each column (categories were
chosen for an even distribution over object type). As described
in Section IV-E, these images corroborate that adversarial
training had little benefit for the COCO problem, potentially
due to the many overlapping objects in the training data. As
might be expected, the networks that were “balanced” resulted
in less coherent explanations of the “person” class but better
explanations for the other classes.
C
1
person 0.28
<input>
person 0.92
<guess>
person 0.24
<real>
person 0.92
person
fire hyd 0.89
fire hydrant
elephant 0.78
elephant
umbrella 0.60
umbrella
wine gla 0.44
wine glass
broccoli 0.81
broccoli
dining t 0.48
dining table
person 0.12
toaster
C
2
person 0.31 person 0.90 cat 0.34 person 0.90 fire hyd 0.90 elephant 0.73 umbrella 0.71 wine gla 0.86 broccoli 0.86 dining t 0.56 person 0.26
C
3
baseball 0.05 baseball 1.00 cat 0.25 fire hyd 0.35 fire hyd 0.98 elephant 0.69 umbrella 0.49 wine gla 0.91 broccoli 0.82 bowl 0.25 toaster 1.00
C
4
cat 0.05 baseball 1.00 cat 0.45 motorcyc 0.21 fire hyd 0.99 elephant 0.81 umbrella 0.78 wine gla 0.96 broccoli 0.90 dining t 0.26 toaster 1.00
(a)
C
1
car 0.53
<input>
car 0.74
<guess>
truck 0.57
<real>
person 0.76
person
fire hyd 0.56
fire hydrant
person 0.17
elephant
umbrella 0.35
umbrella
wine gla 0.34
wine glass
broccoli 0.29
broccoli
dining t 0.47
dining table
person 0.10
toaster
C
2
car 0.54 car 0.80 truck 0.67 person 0.45 fire hyd 0.61 person 0.32 umbrella 0.26 person 0.28 person 0.30 dining t 0.57 person 0.25
C
3
car 0.48 car 0.71 truck 0.67 motorcyc 0.25 fire hyd 0.99 bear 0.16 umbrella 0.14 wine gla 0.31 broccoli 0.24 dining t 0.16 toaster 0.69
C
4
truck 0.46 car 0.79 truck 0.82 motorcyc 0.14 fire hyd 0.97 sheep 0.14 umbrella 0.50 wine gla 0.70 broccoli 0.33 dining t 0.24 toaster 0.98
(b)
Fig. S9: See Appendix D for details.
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<input>
person 0.91
<guess>
bird 0.48
<real>
person 0.91
person
fire hyd 0.93
fire hydrant
elephant 0.87
elephant
person 0.29
umbrella
wine gla 0.60
wine glass
broccoli 0.77
broccoli
dining t 0.56
dining table
person 0.10
toaster
C
2
person 0.26 person 0.95 bird 0.81 person 0.95 fire hyd 0.87 elephant 0.84 umbrella 0.55 wine gla 0.79 broccoli 0.82 dining t 0.60 person 0.24
C
3
bird 0.11 giraffe 0.92 bird 0.96 person 0.29 fire hyd 0.99 elephant 0.71 umbrella 0.50 wine gla 0.83 broccoli 0.77 bowl 0.28 toaster 1.00
C
4
bird 0.15 giraffe 0.98 bird 1.00 person 0.13 fire hyd 1.00 elephant 0.83 umbrella 0.86 wine gla 0.94 broccoli 0.86 dining t 0.31 toaster 1.00
(a)
C
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clock 0.84
<input>
person 0.51
<guess>
clock 0.95
<real>
person 0.51
person
fire hyd 0.29
fire hydrant
person 0.11
elephant
umbrella 0.25
umbrella
cup 0.12
wine glass
broccoli 0.15
broccoli
dining t 0.52
dining table
person 0.09
toaster
C
2
clock 0.93 person 0.90 clock 0.98 person 0.90 fire hyd 0.40 person 0.28 clock 0.23 person 0.21 broccoli 0.33 dining t 0.57 person 0.23
C
3
clock 0.93 tennis r 0.96 clock 0.99 fire hyd 0.18 fire hyd 0.61 clock 0.08 clock 0.19 wine gla 0.39 broccoli 0.23 clock 0.23 toaster 1.00
C
4
clock 0.97 tennis r 0.99 clock 1.00 clock 0.20 fire hyd 0.43 clock 0.37 clock 0.30 wine gla 0.52 clock 0.29 clock 0.32 toaster 0.99
(b)
C
1
car 0.42
<input>
truck 0.62
<guess>
car 0.73
<real>
person 0.89
person
fire hyd 0.66
fire hydrant
person 0.18
elephant
umbrella 0.62
umbrella
wine gla 0.52
wine glass
broccoli 0.12
broccoli
dining t 0.66
dining table
person 0.10
toaster
C
2
truck 0.44 truck 0.74 car 0.77 person 0.91 fire hyd 0.52 person 0.35 umbrella 0.58 wine gla 0.87 person 0.27 dining t 0.72 person 0.24
C
3
truck 0.46 truck 0.75 car 0.66 motorcyc 0.23 fire hyd 0.98 horse 0.10 umbrella 0.46 wine gla 0.88 broccoli 0.14 dining t 0.21 car 0.05
C
4
truck 0.50 truck 0.83 car 0.73 motorcyc 0.10 fire hyd 0.96 horse 0.11 umbrella 0.68 wine gla 0.91 potted p 0.14 dining t 0.38 toaster 0.28
(c)
Fig. S10: See Appendix D for details.
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E. ILSVRC 2012
These images contain adversarial explanations for networks
from Table III: I1 is the network labeled “Ltarget = 3.1,”
which had no adversarial training, I2 is the network labeled
“Ltarget = 3.1 with HHAT,  = 0.1,” I3 is the network labeled
“Ltarget = 5.0,” and I4 is the network labeled “Ltarget = 5.0,
Ladv,z=2,q=1.” The BTR ARAs for I1 through I4 were 0.0182,
0.0282, 0.0388, and 0.0538.
Like Fig. S4, the Fig. S11 demonstrates how explanations
progress as ρ is varied. Between I1 and I2, adversarial training
was clearly beneficial on ILSVRC, consistent with the BTR
ARA results in Table III. We draw particular attention to the
diminished effect on the background of the image in Fig. S11a,
which is lettering on a sign. While I1, I3, and I4 all add a green
hue to the background, the only network trained with both
Eq. (9) and adversarial training did not exhibit this effect. For
both Figs. S11a and S11b, the higher the value of Ltarget, the
simpler and more coherent the explanation. While I4 exhibited
the highest BTR ARA of 0.0538 compared to 0.0282 for I2,
the best attack ARA was from I2, at a value of 0.0053 versus
0.0037 for I4.
Figures S12 to S14 follow a similar format to those in
Appendix D, with “<guess>” and “<real>” having the same
meaning, and the remaining columns being various targets for
gexplain+.
I1
0.00 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.10 0.12 0.14 0.16 0.18 0.20
I2
I3
I4
(a)
I1
0.00 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.10 0.12 0.14 0.16 0.18 0.20
I2
I3
I4
(b)
Fig. S11: See Appendix E for details.
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I1
cradle 0.02
<input>
cradle 1.00
<guess>
tabby 0.96
<real>
sax 1.00
sax
great wh 1.00
great white
robin 1.00
robin
bald eag 1.00
bald eagle
red fox 1.00
red fox
beaker 1.00
beaker
banana 1.00
banana
tractor 1.00
tractor
I2
chocolat 0.05 chocolat 1.00 tabby 0.95 sax 0.99 great wh 0.74 robin 1.00 bald eag 1.00 red fox 0.91 beaker 0.96 banana 0.99 tractor 0.98
I3
chocolat 0.00 chocolat 0.98 tabby 0.75 sax 0.34 sturgeon 0.00 robin 1.00 bald eag 0.93 red fox 0.10 beaker 0.07 banana 0.23 tractor 0.84
I4
chocolat 0.01 chocolat 0.61 tabby 0.16 sax 0.22 snorkel 0.03 robin 0.93 bald eag 0.21 red fox 0.01 beer gla 0.05 banana 0.05 tractor 0.71
(a)
I1
beach wa 0.25
<input>
beach wa 1.00
<guess>
pickup 1.00
<real>
sax 1.00
sax
great wh 1.00
great white
robin 1.00
robin
bald eag 1.00
bald eagle
red fox 1.00
red fox
beaker 1.00
beaker
banana 1.00
banana
tractor 1.00
tractor
I2
limousin 0.23 limousin 1.00 pickup 0.94 sax 0.98 great wh 0.92 robin 0.99 bald eag 0.98 red fox 0.90 beaker 0.99 banana 0.97 tractor 0.94
I3
limousin 0.21 limousin 0.99 pickup 0.78 cornet 0.12 great wh 0.05 robin 0.93 killer w 0.05 kit fox 0.16 beaker 0.32 cucumber 0.07 tractor 0.88
I4
limousin 0.23 limousin 0.99 pickup 0.54 sax 0.15 tiger sh 0.03 robin 0.29 bald eag 0.03 lesser p 0.03 beaker 0.05 cucumber 0.06 tractor 0.70
(b)
I1
quill 0.03
<input>
quill 1.00
<guess>
american 1.00
<real>
sax 1.00
sax
great wh 1.00
great white
robin 1.00
robin
bald eag 1.00
bald eagle
red fox 1.00
red fox
beaker 1.00
beaker
banana 1.00
banana
tractor 1.00
tractor
I2
plane 0.11 plane 1.00 american 0.98 sax 1.00 great wh 0.73 robin 0.99 bald eag 0.97 red fox 0.97 beaker 0.76 banana 1.00 tractor 0.91
I3
plane 0.02 plane 1.00 american 0.80 sax 0.40 bullet t 0.01 robin 1.00 bald eag 0.58 kit fox 0.24 pill bot 0.02 banana 0.94 tractor 0.57
I4
plane 0.02 plane 0.99 american 0.36 sax 0.38 plane 0.00 robin 0.76 bald eag 0.08 red fox 0.03 lotion 0.01 banana 0.52 tractor 0.20
(c)
Fig. S12: See Appendix E for details.
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I1
wall clo 0.69
<input>
analog c 0.99
<guess>
wall clo 1.00
<real>
sax 1.00
sax
great wh 1.00
great white
robin 1.00
robin
bald eag 1.00
bald eagle
red fox 0.99
red fox
beaker 1.00
beaker
banana 1.00
banana
tractor 1.00
tractor
I2
wall clo 0.63 analog c 0.97 wall clo 0.99 sax 0.96 great wh 0.62 robin 0.97 bald eag 0.88 red fox 0.93 beaker 0.98 banana 0.88 tractor 0.97
I3
wall clo 0.52 analog c 0.81 wall clo 0.88 french h 0.08 nematode 0.06 robin 0.98 water ou 0.05 red fox 0.30 beaker 0.49 banana 0.10 tractor 0.71
I4
wall clo 0.41 analog c 0.69 wall clo 0.88 cornet 0.16 great wh 0.01 robin 0.50 house fi 0.05 red fox 0.07 beaker 0.11 coil 0.16 tractor 0.74
(a)
I1
racer 0.06
<input>
racer 1.00
<guess>
sports c 1.00
<real>
sax 1.00
sax
great wh 1.00
great white
robin 1.00
robin
bald eag 1.00
bald eagle
red fox 1.00
red fox
beaker 1.00
beaker
banana 1.00
banana
tractor 1.00
tractor
I2
cab 0.11 cab 1.00 sports c 0.93 sax 0.95 great wh 0.98 robin 0.99 bald eag 0.98 red fox 0.92 beaker 0.99 banana 0.85 tractor 0.97
I3
limousin 0.05 limousin 0.99 sports c 0.81 cornet 0.08 great wh 0.28 robin 0.99 killer w 0.04 kit fox 0.10 beaker 0.69 cucumber 0.06 tractor 0.71
I4
snowplow 0.01 snowplow 0.98 sports c 0.76 cornet 0.24 great wh 0.11 robin 0.75 sulphur- 0.01 red fox 0.04 beaker 0.07 zucchini 0.14 tractor 0.63
(b)
I1
pineappl 0.79
<input>
corn 0.99
<guess>
pineappl 1.00
<real>
sax 1.00
sax
great wh 0.97
great white
robin 1.00
robin
bald eag 1.00
bald eagle
red fox 1.00
red fox
beaker 1.00
beaker
banana 1.00
banana
tractor 1.00
tractor
I2
pineappl 0.14 ear 0.98 pineappl 1.00 sax 1.00 great wh 0.32 robin 1.00 bald eag 0.95 red fox 0.96 beaker 0.99 banana 1.00 tractor 0.98
I3
pineappl 0.03 vault 1.00 pineappl 1.00 sax 0.55 water sn 0.00 robin 1.00 bald eag 0.31 red fox 0.60 beaker 0.72 banana 0.58 tractor 0.85
I4
pineappl 0.01 ear 0.86 pineappl 1.00 sax 0.53 little b 0.01 robin 0.98 coucal 0.01 red fox 0.34 beaker 0.18 banana 0.34 tractor 0.79
(c)
Fig. S13: See Appendix E for details.
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I1
fire eng 0.98
<input>
tow truc 1.00
<guess>
fire eng 1.00
<real>
sax 1.00
sax
great wh 1.00
great white
robin 1.00
robin
bald eag 1.00
bald eagle
red fox 1.00
red fox
beaker 1.00
beaker
banana 1.00
banana
tractor 1.00
tractor
I2
fire eng 0.75 tow truc 0.98 fire eng 1.00 sax 0.98 great wh 0.96 robin 1.00 bald eag 0.96 red fox 0.92 beaker 0.99 banana 0.97 tractor 0.98
I3
fire eng 0.76 tow truc 0.57 fire eng 1.00 sax 0.32 great wh 0.10 robin 0.99 water ou 0.04 red fox 0.47 beaker 0.58 abacus 0.05 tractor 0.89
I4
fire eng 0.18 tow truc 0.24 fire eng 1.00 sax 0.12 snorkel 0.03 robin 0.94 go-kart 0.09 red fox 0.18 beaker 0.10 cucumber 0.02 tractor 0.87
(a)
I1
tow truc 0.44
<input>
tow truc 0.99
<guess>
trailer 1.00
<real>
sax 1.00
sax
great wh 1.00
great white
robin 1.00
robin
bald eag 1.00
bald eagle
red fox 0.99
red fox
beaker 1.00
beaker
banana 1.00
banana
tractor 1.00
tractor
I2
tow truc 0.26 tow truc 0.98 trailer 0.99 sax 0.95 great wh 0.42 robin 0.97 bald eag 0.91 red fox 0.88 beaker 0.91 banana 0.94 tractor 0.95
I3
tow truc 0.13 tow truc 0.65 trailer 0.78 sax 0.04 solar di 0.00 robin 0.91 bald eag 0.31 kit fox 0.07 beaker 0.05 cucumber 0.01 tractor 0.76
I4
racer 0.09 racer 0.98 trailer 0.59 sax 0.04 speedboa 0.01 robin 0.19 white st 0.02 red fox 0.02 beaker 0.03 go-kart 0.05 tractor 0.49
(b)
I1
vizsla 0.31
<input>
chesapea 1.00
<guess>
vizsla 1.00
<real>
sax 1.00
sax
great wh 0.99
great white
robin 1.00
robin
bald eag 1.00
bald eagle
red fox 0.99
red fox
beaker 1.00
beaker
banana 1.00
banana
tractor 1.00
tractor
I2
vizsla 0.13 redbone 0.92 vizsla 0.98 sax 0.99 great wh 0.07 robin 1.00 bald eag 0.98 red fox 0.92 beaker 0.97 banana 0.99 tractor 0.98
I3
comic bo 0.03 comic bo 1.00 vizsla 0.75 sax 0.33 comic bo 0.00 robin 1.00 bald eag 0.65 red fox 0.22 beaker 0.08 banana 0.23 tractor 0.80
I4
comic bo 0.03 comic bo 1.00 vizsla 0.17 sax 0.32 snorkel 0.01 robin 0.96 bald eag 0.11 red fox 0.07 beer gla 0.03 banana 0.11 tractor 0.72
(c)
Fig. S14: See Appendix E for details.
